Exchange rate in transition by Kocenda, Evzen
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Exchange rate in transition
Evzen Kocenda
Charles University, CERGE
1998
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/32030/
MPRA Paper No. 32030, posted 5. July 2011 14:17 UTC
Exchange Rate in Transition
Evžen Kocenda
CERGE, Charles University
CERGE, Charles University
Published by:
CERGE
Charles University
Politických veznu 7
111 21 Praha 1
© Evžen Kocenda, 1998
Reviewed by: Jan Hanousek
ISBN 80-86286-08-8
To Monika
Preface
In this book several econometric techniques are used to perform quantitative
research of the exchange rate in transition. This is an empirical work based
on related economic theory. While the stress is put on the exchange rate of
the Czech koruna, the subject is analyzed from a broader perspective of
other transition countries as well. I have used parts of the original text in my
class Econometrics IV (Applied Time Series) that I teach at CERGE of
Charles University.
I am grateful to many people for their help. I am indebted to a colleague and
friend of mine, Jan Hanousek, who carefully reviewed the text. I had the
benefit of comments and suggestions from (in alphabetical order): Parker
Ballinger, Štepán Cábelka, W. Davis Dechert, John Fahy, Randall Filer, Jan
Hanousek, Martin Kupka, Lubomír Lízal, David Papell, Christof Ruehl, Raúl
Susmel, and František Turnovec.
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Conditional variance analysis of the exchange rate 6
2.1 Exchange rate environment 6
2.2 Data and the currency basket 7
2.3 Process underlying exchange rate movement 11
2.4 Conditional variance 15
2.5 Testing the fit of the model 20
2.6 Empirical summary 25
3 Volatility of exchange rate with change in fluctuation band 27
3.1 Altered band 27
3.2 Data 28
3.3 Leverage effect 29
3.4 Leverage effect empirics in exchange rate 31
3.5 Brief summary 34
4 Intratemporal links among interest and exchange rates 36
4.1 Basic facts 36
4.2 Vector autoregressive analysis of lead-lag relationship 38
4.3 Data 41
4.4 Intratemporal linkages 41
4.5 Comments and implications 49
5 Convergence of exchange rates 51
5.1 Exchange rate and its regime in transition countries 51
5.2 Data and definitions 70
5.3 Methodology of convergence 72
5.4 Empirical results of convergence analysis 77
5.5 Concluding observations 83
References 85
11 Introduction
At this point, nearly a decade into transition, the Czech Republic has
completed the early stages of the process. The country has launched
various privatization programs and has adopted an extensive range of
measures to implement monetary and fiscal policies that would suit the
needs of the overall transformation. Aside from private investors,
numerous international organizations have become involved to aid the
process. Naturally, the country recorded both achievements and failures.
Any country in transition must undergo a stage of macroeconomic
stabilization, which is inevitably accompanied by large shocks to
macroeconomic fundamentals. The nature and magnitude of these
disruptions affect the progress of economic development. Research into
the success of the stabilization programs in transition economies is
especially important for policymakers. Owing to the relative openness and
the close economic relations among transition economies in Central and
Eastern Europe and between these countries and the European Union, the
exchange rate and the exchange rate regime play an important role in
economic development.
The stability of the exchange rate and a type of its regime are important
elements in the overall monetary policy of each country. The significance
of the matter is even more accentuated in the case of transition economies
because international lending institutions like the International Monetary
Fund, the World Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development provide credit subject to macroeconomic stability and a
stable exchange rate. This is true no matter what kind of regime is
adopted.
The following chapters analyze the role of the exchange rate and its
regime in the Czech Republic, its influence on financial market, and the
evolution of exchange rates among the Central and Eastern European
2countries from the beginning of the transformation until recently. The
overall analysis is based on an economic theory and applies both classical
and advanced econometric techniques. Thus, the theoretical approach
allows the formulation of qualified empirical conclusions.
Chapter 2 concentrates on a conditional variance analysis of the
exchange rate of the Czech koruna. Several detailed studies have applied
the generalization of the autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic
(ARCH) model to assess the changing variances of exchange rates and
their distribution. Knowledge of the exchange rate behavior has important
implications for the decisions made in an international financial
environment. The opening of new emerging markets in Central and
Eastern Europe has increased interest in exploring the behavior of the
exchange rates of the region. Central and Eastern European economies are
undergoing a unique transformation and for these reasons their exchange
rate arrangements differ from those in the developed economies.
This chapter examines the behavior of the exchange rate of the Czech
koruna when pegged to a currency basket. This is a significant
contribution to the field because, so far, no research has applied the
ARCH model to such an exchange rate. The exchange rates are described
both narratively and from a statistical point of view. A short explanation is
provided on how the exchange rate movement is related to the currency
basket peg. The peg is supposed to limit the overall instability of the
currency, and hence, stabilize the exchange rate. This is conditional on the
central bank keeping the index of the currency basket within a narrow
band without subjective tampering. If inconsistency occurs, the pegged
rates do not fully reflect the underlying processes in free exchange rates
and further analysis is futile.
The tests that discover similarities between a pegged exchange rate
system and the behavior of free floating exchange rates are presented,
supporting the employment of an ARCH model. The GARCH(1,1) model
with daily dummy variables in both mean and variance equations is
applied to model the conditional variance in exchange rates in order to
3account for heteroskedasticity. Estimates of the models are presented
separately for the mean and variance equations along with statistical tests
that show comparable as well as differing results from referenced studies.
A separate section elaborates on the nonlinearity in exchange rate
movement and uses an advanced nonparametric BDS statistic to test the
results. The quantitative results are applied to the behavior of exchange
rates and central bank policy.
Chapter 3 extends the analysis from the previous chapter and presents a
modification of the technique used. This part examines the behavior of the
exchange rate of the Czech koruna when pegged to a currency basket
under different fluctuation bands. The currency basket peg is supposed to
limit the overall instability of the currency. Such limiting means
stabilizing the exchange rate and lowering its volatility. Again, this is
conditional on the central bank keeping the index of the currency basket
within a narrow band. The purpose of the analysis is to show how the
volatility of the exchange rate is affected by allowing for a wider
fluctuation band.
The GARCH-L(1,1) model with a dummy variable for the volatility
response to the koruna’s appreciation in a variance equation is applied in
order to model conditional variance in exchange rates. This is done in
order to account for the change in the width of the fluctuation band.
Estimates of the models are presented for the mean and variance
equations. The results show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the
volatility of the various exchange rates decreased after a much wider
fluctuation band was introduced to limit movements of the currency
basket index.
The previous two chapters present an economic and institutional
background of the exchange rate regime that has governed the behavior of
the Czech koruna since the early 90’s. Since the exchange rate regime is
an important element in the overall monetary policy of every country, it
substantially influences financial market. This influence is often likely to
be an indirect one via interest rates. Such an influence is discussed in
4chapter 4 where we analyze the linkages between interest rates, as well as
interest rates and exchange rates, and compare the results of the periods
before 1997 with those in the year, when the country experienced financial
crisis. The concept of Granger causality within the framework of the
bivariate Vector Autoregressive model is used as an econometric tool to
test the respective hypotheses.
The relatively stable environment of the fixed exchange rate regime and
semi-regulated interest rates provided a soft environment for the evolution
of links among key interest rates and the exchange rate. The bonds among
interest rates tended to evolve in a weak economic sense. During the
turbulent times of the financial crisis, the prevailing links among interest
rates tended to gain strength and the money market became more efficient
than ever before. The evolution of the linkages also showed that interest
rates influenced the exchange rate during the year of crisis. The exchange
rate was found to influence only the short-term interest rates.
The broader perspective of exchange rate analysis among Central and
Eastern European countries is discussed in chapter 5. Here we address the
question of whether the transition countries have achieved exchange rate
development that would eventually lead to greater similarities with the
countries within the European Union.
The transition process in Central and Eastern Europe provides a unique
opportunity to carry out a quantitative analysis of exchange rate
convergence within distinctive groups of the Central and Eastern
European countries. Transposed from the original application to growth of
output, the convergence of exchange rates should be reflected in a
reduction of the exchange rate differentials across countries over time.
The panel unit-root test is the econometric tool used to test our hypothesis.
In the case of the Central and Eastern European countries, a relevant and
related question arises. With so many varieties of exchange rate regimes,
does the degree of convergence depend on a particular exchange rate
regime? Or, in other words, is convergence faster in countries that favored
some kind of tight exchange regime as opposed to a rather free one?
5Investigating to what extent the exchange rate regime is partially
susceptible to supporting convergence, or to preventing it, can enhance
our knowledge of how transition economies function not only from an
academic point of view. It can also provide concrete evidence and
enhanced policy tools for addressing the issue of European Union
accession. The results of the analysis support convergence in general.
However, the findings seem to indicate that the answer to the question of
convergence is far from obvious and may not be the same for all countries
(or groups of countries).
62 Conditional variance analysis of the exchange rate
2.1 Exchange rate environment
In 1991, former Czechoslovakia officially started its economic
transformation. From this time the role of the exchange rate could no
longer be disfigured as in the former centrally planned economy.
However, a certain reduction in the relative volatility of exchange rates
was desirable in order to promote export, direct foreign investments and
generally favorable economic development during the transition to a free
market economy. With the absence of fully functioning financial markets,
the newly emerged private sector was extremely vulnerable to exchange
rate fluctuations. The fixed exchange rate provided a less volatile
environment according to policy makers at that time.
The shock of the transition needed to be buffered, and therefore, to
introduce a floating exchange rate system would have been premature. A
floating exchange rate regime requires that no restrictions on financial
capital movement be imposed. This necessitates a strong mature economy
with sufficient reserves of convertible currencies. During the early stages
of economic reform, the country did not meet these conditions and an
eventual bank run could have caused vast damage. The situation resulted
in a temporary anchor of the currency basket peg. We will define currency
basket and describe its properties in the next section. Further, additional
detailed discussion on the role of fixed exchange rates can be found in
Svensson (1994).
In the beginning of 1993 Czechoslovakia was split into two independent
nations. Monetary separation of the Czech and Slovak republics followed
shortly after the formal division of the state. From this point on the Czech
koruna has remained for several years more or less stable, unlike its
Slovak counterpart, which has devalued to a certain extent over time. Full
7convertibility of the koruna was implemented on October 1, 1995, and
meant that the koruna could be traded for foreign exchange without
restrictions by both companies and citizens. However, this step was not
paired with any change in the exchange rate regime and the koruna
remained pegged to the currency basket. Thus, after this date, the
exchange rate of the koruna was still not completely free to float as the
currencies of developed economies. We now proceed to statistical
description of exchange rates in question as well as of a currency basket.
2.2 Data and the currency basket
The data consists of daily midpoint exchange rates of the Czech koruna
(CZK) to six major currencies during the period from January 2, 1991 to
September 30, 1994. The split-up of the former Czechoslovakia on
January 1, 1993 generated two separate currencies (Czech koruna and
Slovak koruna) which replaced the former Czechoslovak koruna. The
entire series is referred to as the Czech koruna because it (CZK) followed
the former stable path of the old Czechoslovak koruna. After the monetary
separation the Slovak koruna has devaluated considerably. The data was
supplied by the Czech National Bank (CNB), Prague. Six major currencies
were selected for this study because of their importance in international
trade and their inclusion in the currency basket to which the Czech koruna
is pegged. The rates of foreign currencies in terms of the Czech koruna
are: British Pound (GBP), Austrian Shilling (ATS), Deutsche Mark
(DEM), U.S. Dollar (USD), Swiss Franc (CHF), and French Franc (FRF).
There are a total of 953 daily observations for each currency.
Table 2.1 contains the summary statistics of the data. The means are
fairly small. However, their negative sign implies that the koruna has, on
average, slightly depreciated over time. The low variance indicates a
stable evolution.
8Table 2.1 Summary statistics of log price changes:
rt = log(Rt/Rt-1)*100
Statistics GBP ATS DEM USD CHF FRF
Mean -0.02163 -0.00242 -0.00416 0.00534 -0.00156 -0.00447
Variance 0.23785 0.12908 0.11577 0.22176 0.20454 0.12005
Skewness -1.68703 -0.40586 -0.57688 0.34574 -0.16915 -0.76434
Kurtosis 16.2077 2.35196 3.21914 1.65811 2.57694 6.27226
Maximum 1.99089 1.53259 1.28961 2.45490 2.28472 1.49497
Minimum -4.9373 -1.19121 -1.73237 -1.69109 -2.34774 -2.75034
Figure 2.1 Evolution of Exchange Rates: Nominal Levels
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The range of daily changes is relatively small with one exception. A drop
of almost 5 percent of GBP coincides with the time when GBP left the
European Monetary System. Unconditional distributions for the three rates
show a typical property of a fat tail implying the non-normal distribution
as indicated by the fourth moment.
9Figure 2.1 shows the evolution of the respective exchange rates over the
entire period. The data are not stationary but are a first-order integrated
process. The rate of change is calculated by taking the logarithmic
difference between two consecutive business days. Figure 2.2 represents
the logarithmic first order differences of exchange rates. It serves as a
visual test for stationarity and illustrates the periods of volatility.
Figure 2.2 First Logarithmic Differences of Exchange Rates
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In order to address properly the question of how the exchange rate
behaved during the researched period we introduce a short description of
the monetary instrument called currency basket. The currency basket was
primarily meant to be a nominal anchor that allows, under a prudent
policy, to keep a relatively stable nominal exchange rate. Currency is
pegged to a currency basket when it is bound to several currencies via
exchange rates in certain proportions. The currency basket is, according to
the International Monetary Fund, categorized as a type of fixed exchange
10
rate arrangement. The CNB introduced the basket system at its current
general level at the beginning of 1991 and constructed the basket as a
weighted average of nominal exchange rates. The use of weighted average
mathematically creates a slight discrepancy by not fully exploiting the
importance of the respective currencies, which are represented by their
weights. This would be eliminated by using a geometric average instead.
The change in the value of the currency basket is measured by its index
I(t,w), which the CNB defines as
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]å
=
=
N
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jjj RtRwwtI
1
0/, (2.1)
where jw is a weight (å = 1jw ), Rj(t) is the domestic exchange rate at
time t, and Rj(0) is the domestic exchange rate at time 0, i.e. the base
exchange rate. Both rates are at nominal levels. In order to peg the home
currency to a currency basket, the index must be fixed. In this case it
means that the index is set to be equal to one (I(t,w) = 1). It should be
stressed that the index is calculated from daily midpoint exchange rates
and, for the purpose of this analysis, serves only as an illustration of how
the index evolved over time.
Table 2.2 Basket Composition, Currency Weights, and Base Rates across Periods
Period GBP ATS DEM USD CHF FRF
Jan. 1,1991 - Jan. 1, 1992 Weight 0.0424 0.1235 0.4552 0.3134 0.0655 -
Base Rate 52.50 2.59 18.23 28.00 21.34 -
Jan. 2, 1992 – May 2, 1993 Weight - 0.0807 0.3615 0.4907 0.0379 0.0292
Base Rate - 2.61 18.35 27.84 20.57 5.37
May 3, 1993 - Jun. 26, 1997 Weight - - 0.6500 0.3500 - -
Base Rate - - 17.995 28.443 - -
Weights sum up to 1 and represent relative importance of particular currency in the balance of payments.
Base rates are constant over respective period.
Table 2.2 illustrates three changes in weights and base rates that took
place during the four-year period. The weights represent relative
importance of the particular foreign currency in the turnover of the Czech
balance of payments excluding banking operations. The fluctuation band
11
imposed on the basket was set at ± 0.5%. The CNB managed to keep the
index of the basket within the band during all three periods. The index
was held on average at 0.9999, 1.0011, and 0.9952 for the respective
periods. However, minor mismanagements occurred as can be seen in
Figure 2.3 that shows the evolution of the currency basket index over the
entire period.
Figure 2.3 Evolution of the Currency Basket Index
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2.3 Process underlying exchange rate movement
2.3.1 Theoretical background
Many economic and especially financial variables reflect the stylized facts
attributed to Mandelbrot (1963). These are: (1) unconditional distributions
have thick tails, (2) variances change over time, and (3) large (small)
changes tend to be followed by large (small) changes of either sign. These
stylized facts are especially appealing in the context of high frequency
financial data such as exchange rates and stock prices.
The distribution and statistical properties of exchange rates are of
considerable interest since the time when exchange rates of major
currencies started to float. The importance of this knowledge has very
practical implications: the effects of exchange rates movement on
international trade and capital flows, mean-variance analysis of
12
international asset portfolios, and the pricing of options on foreign
currencies. The opening of new emerging markets in Central Europe has
led to interest in the behavior of exchange rates of these economies since
they broaden frontiers to international investments. To know the statistical
properties and to define the behavior of the particular currency may lower
the risk involved in international financial activity.
The fat tails of the exchange rates distributions imply increased
uncertainty, and this feature attracts attention. In order to account for
leptokurtosis, two different explanations were suggested in literature,
namely by Friedman and Vandersteel (1982). One idea suggests that the
rates are independently drawn from a fat tail distribution that is fixed over
time. The other view favors distributions that vary over time. Hsieh (1988)
found a strong statistical evidence to discriminate between the two
competing theories. His evidence points to the rejection of the first
hypothesis because of changing means and variances of daily rates. This
feature can be best described by accounting for the conditional
autoregressive heteroskedasticity in modeling the variance that was first
introduced by Engle (1982).
So far, research interest has concentrated on free-floating exchange
rates. It is clear that it is not much useful to study firmly fixed exchange
rates in a time series context since they represent just series of equal
numbers over a period of time. However, the behavior of semi-fixed
exchange rates that can be observed in case of the currency basket
arrangement, does not offer such a clear explanation. At first, due to the
condition that the basket index be kept at some constant relative to its
construction and deviation is allowed only within the band, exchange rates
are to closely follow their “master” currencies in many respects. On the
other hand, exchange rates are likely to be exposed to the subjective
actions of a central bank that may try to manipulate certain exchange rates
within or outside the limits of the basket. The reason would be to pursue
its own targeting policy or to smooth outside negative influences in order
to maintain relative stability of exchange rates. Volatile periods may
13
emerge from both motives mentioned above. The consistent monetary
policy of the central bank with respect to the stable index is therefore
imperative in order to produce mathematically consistent semi-fixed
exchange rates. Fortunately, this is the case for the Czech koruna.
Milhøj (1987) modeled the distribution of daily deviations of the U.S.
Dollar to Special Drawing Rights (SDR) using a simple ARCH model.
SDR has been a composite of currencies since July 1, 1974. However, the
U.S. Dollar is not pegged to this basket and thus such a modeling does not
involve semi-fixed exchange rate. Therefore, the exchange rate of the
Czech koruna to other currencies represents an interesting modeling
challenge.
2.3.2 Autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity
The original ARCH model framework of Engle (1982) suggests that
current volatility depends on past squared innovations in order to explain
the tendency of large residuals to cluster together. Bollerslev (1986)
extended the framework into a generalized autoregressive conditional
heteroskedasticity model (GARCH) where current volatility depends not
only on past squared residuals but also on lagged autoregressive
component, e.g. lagged own variances. By deriving residuals et from an
underlying process, which are conditioned by the information set Wt, a
GARCH(p,q) process is given by
),0(~| 21 ttt N se -W  (2.2)
with conditional autoregressive variance specified as
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Conditional variance may be denoted by ht in the part of the literature. We
feel that use of 2ts  to denote conditional variance is sufficiently
illustrative. As for the ARCH model, by far the most popular model of this
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type that has been used to describe financial data volatility is the
generalized specification GARCH(1,1).
Whether the ARCH process described above is present in the data can be
detected by subsequent tests. In order to remove any linear structure in the
data, an autoregressive filter is applied. Each series is modeled as an
autoregressive process of the form
titr e+å -
10
1=i
i0t a+a=r (2.4)
where te  is independently and identically distributed (iid). The Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) method of Akaike (1974) was employed to
determine the appropriate number of lags.
Table 2.3 shows the results of two independent test performed on
residuals from the mean equation (AR(10)) to detect presence of an
ARCH process described above. A Lagrange-multiplier test suggested by
Engle (1982), tests a null hypothesis that no ARCH process is present in
the data. The values of LM(10) are distributed according to the chi-
squared distribution with 10 degrees of freedom and the null hypothesis
can be decisively rejected at any confidence level for all six rates.
 A Ljung-Box (1974) test against higher order serial correlation was
performed for up to the tenth order. The values of Ljung-Box Q statistic
are distributed asymptotically according to the chi-squared distribution
with 10 degrees of freedom. The values for the first moments are
extremely low and are not statistically significant at any reasonable level
for any of the six currencies. This fact indicates that there is no higher
order serial correlation present in the data. On the other hand, the values
of the Ljung-Box Q statistic for absence of serial correlation in squared
residuals are high enough above a 1% significance level to indicate the
presence of serial correlation here. The absence of serial dependence in
the first conditional moments and its strong presence in the conditional
second moments indicate an ARCH process.
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Table 2.3  Testing for conditional heteroskedasticity  and serial correlation
Statistics GBP ATS DEM USD CHF FRF
LM(10) 77.00 114.44 82.34 51.06 77.49 96.01
Q(10) 0.3536 0.0964 0.0936 0.282 0.0104 0.1987
Q2(10) 110.05 156.94 130.32 64.97 94.24 135.09
Skewness -1.441 -0.404 -0.674 0.326 -0.179 -0.854
Kurtosis 14.600 2.394 3.523 1.815 2.561 6.474
LM: Lagrange multiplier test by Engle (1982), Q: Ljung-box test against higher order serial
correlation by Ljung-Box (1978), c2 critical value at 1% level with 10 d.f. is 23.21
Despite the fact that the tests were performed using the autoregressive
process with 10 lags, the results of both tests are not sensitive to any
particular choice of lags, as they were replicated for control purpose with
different structures.
The values of the unconditional sample kurtosis exceed a normal value
in the case of three currencies. This fact, along with the results of previous
tests, shows that an autoregressive process appears to account for the
serial correlation properties of the daily data. However, it does not
adequately describe the heteroskedasticity or the large kurtosis present in
the daily rates. The next step is to employ an ARCH model with
conditionally distributed errors and daily dummy variables in both
conditional mean and conditional variance equations.
2.4 Conditional variance
2.4.1 Modelling
Brock, Hsieh, and LeBaron (1993), p. 130, point out that a prevalent view
in literature is that exchange rates follow a random walk. However, no
strong statistical evidence has emerged to confirm or refute this view so
far. Research done with exchange rates and security prices uses random
walk as well as different univariate processes. When taking into account a
basket pegged character of the exchange rates in the data set, a possibility
of a specific underlining process cannot be overlooked.
An autoregressive process was chosen as a proxy to model the
underlying process in the data. The AIC method was employed to
16
determine the appropriate number of lags. AR(10) structure was also the
efficient way to filter the data so that the model yielded residuals free of
autocorrelation and seasonality as well. To capture plausible changes of
the distribution in different days during a business week, appropriate day-
of-the-week dummy variables were employed. The specification of the
model resulted into the following mean equation
ttHOtTH
tWEtTUtMOit
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dddr
egg
ggg
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++++å -
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1=i
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 a+a=r
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where, ) ,0(~| 2t1 se Dtt -W , and a conditional variance equation
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where tMOd , , tTUd , , tWEd , , tTHd , are dummy variables for Monday, Tuesday,
Wednesday, and Thursday, and tHOd ,  is the number of holidays (excluding
weekends) between successive business days.
The restrictions on the parameters in the variance equation require that
w > 0, a ³ 0, and b ³ 0. Further, when a + b < 1, then the unconditional
variance is finite and stationarity is ensured by not having unit root as
shown by Bollerslev (1986).
Estimation of the model is performed by using a log-likelihood function
of the form
( )( )2221221 /ln tttL ses --= . (2.7)
Coefficients of the day-of-the-week dummies were expected to be fairly
small and therefore non-negativity restrictions were not imposed on them.
The maximum likelihood estimates are obtained by using a numerical
optimization algorithm described by Berndt, Hall, Hall, and Hausman
(1974).
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Table 2.4 Estimating the mean equation for GARCH(1,1)  r a a r dt i t
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g e
Estimates and
statistics
GBP ATS DEM USD CHF FRF
a0 -0.000529
(0.000355)
-0.000123
(0.000261)
-0.000208
(0.000248)
-0.000243
(0.000343)
-0.000581
(0.000331)
-0.000284
(0.000252)
a1 0.0270
(0.0326)
-0.1070a
(0.0328)
-0.0446
(0.0327)
-0.0155
(0.0326)
-0.0564
(0.0329)
0.0024
(0.0327)
a2 0.0569c
(0.0326)
-0.0271
(0.0330)
0.0304
(0.0337)
0.0460
(0.0326)
-0.0190
(0.0328)
-0.0217
(0.0327)
a3 0.0302
(0.0326)
0.0489
(0.0330)
-0.0227
(0.0327)
-0.0154
(0.0326)
-0.0307
(0.0328)
0.0122
(0.0326)
a4 0.0451
(0.0326)
0.0397
(0.0330)
0.0592
(0.0326)
0.0448
(0.0325)
0.0466
(0.0328)
0.0517
(0.0325)
a5 -0.0400
(0.0327)
0.0214
(0.0330)
0.0283
(0.0327)
0.0151
(0.0326)
0.0018
(0.0328)
0.0214
(0.0325)
a6 -0.0165
(0.0326)
-0.0533
(0.0330)
-0.0551
(0.0327)
-0.0421
(0.0326)
-0.0130
(0.0328)
-0.0233
(0.0325)
a7 -0.0536
(0.0325)
-0.0183
(0.0329)
-0.0188
(0.0325)
-0.0001
(0.0323)
0.0232
(0.0328)
-0.0661a
(0.0324)
a8 0.0383
(0.0326)
-0.0268
(0.0329)
-0.0403
(0.0325)
-0.0115
(0.0324)
-0.0014
(0.0328)
-0.0793a
(0.0325)
a9 0.0428
(0.0326)
0.0088
(0.0329)
0.0076
(0.0325)
-0.0124
(0.0323)
0.0259
(0.0328)
-0.0233
(0.0326)
a10 0.1202a
(0.0325)
0.0499
(0.0327)
0.0696b
(0.0325)
0.0747b
(0.0322)
0.0170
(0.0326)
0.0650a
(0.0326)
g1 5.27×10-4
(5.02×10-4)
-0.61×10-4
(3.70×10-4)
-2.13×10-4
(3.51×10-4)
2.83×10-4
(4.85×10-4)
5.24×10-4
(4.68×10-4)
0.24×10-4
(3.57×10-4)
g2 0.42×10-4
(4.99×10-4)
0.21×10-4
(3.68×10-4)
2.30×10-4
(3.50×10-4)
-2.37×10-4
(4.83×10-4)
7.80×10-4
(4.67×10-4)
1.46×10-4
(3.56×10-4)
g3 8.51×10-4c
(5.01×10-4)
3.62×10-4
(3.69×10-4)
4.92×10-4
(3.51×10-4)
-6.55×10-4
(4.84×10-4)
7.04×10-4
(4.69×10-4)
5.25×10-4
(3.57×10-4)
g4 3.78×10-4
(4.99×10-4)
1.93×10-4
(3.68×10-4)
3.12×10-4
(3.49×10-4)
2.82×10-4
(4.83×10-4)
7.26×10-4
(4.65×10-4)
5.04×10-4
(3.55×10-4)
g5 6.00×10-4
(8.06×10-4)
8.23×10-4
(5.93×10-4)
13.02×10-4b
(5.63×10-4)
-24.76×10-4a
(7.78×10-4)
11.32×10-4
(7.52×10-4)
10.71×10-4c
(5.72×10-4)
Standard errors are in parentheses. Significantly different from zero at 1% (a) , 5% (b) and, 10%(c) level.
The results from the estimation are divided into two separate tables for
better accessibility. Table 2.4 contains estimated parameters from the
mean equation. There are only a few parameters within the lag range from
1 to 9 that are statistically different from zero. However, in four cases
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coefficients of lag 10 are highly significant. This confirms the original
tests suggesting an AR(10) structure in the data. Lag 10 means exactly two
business weeks’ memory of the market.
Table 2.5 Estimating conditional variance for GARCH(1,1):
h ht t t= + + +- -w ae b1
2
1 f f f f f1 2 3 4 5d d d d dMO t TU t WE t TH t HO t, , , , ,+ + + +
Estimates and statistics GBP ATS DEM USD CHF FRF
w 0.036×10-6
(1.07×10-6)
1.68×10-6
(0.95×10-6)
1.75×10-6b
(0.69×10-6)
5.89×10-6a
(1.48×10-6)
0.98×10-6
(1.70×10-6)
0.90×10-6
(0.77×10-6)
a 0.164a
(0.013)
0.048a
(0.013)
0.056a
(0.010)
0.056a
(0.015)
0.053a
(0.011)
0.124a
(0.016)
b 0.824a
(0.016)
0.913a
(0.019)
0.922a
(0.013)
0.906a
(0.021)
0.934a
(0.013)
0.837a
(0.023)
f1 1.35×10-6
(1.69×10-6)
-0.12×10-6
(1.54×10-6)
-1.73×10-6
(1.16×10-6)
-5.95×10-6b
(2.63×10-6)
-2.32×10-6
(2.89×10-6)
0.26×10-6
(1.38×10-6)
f2 1.91×10-6
(1.56×10-6)
3.38×10-6
(1.81×10-6)
5.81×10-6a
(1.33×10-6)
5.31×10-6c
(3.12×10-6)
5.88×10-6b
(2.82×10-6)
2.77×10-6b
(1.43×10-6)
f3 -0.94×10-6
(1.60×10-6)
-7.98×10-6a
(1.47×10-6)
-10.38×10-6a
(1.25×10-6)
-19.03×10-6a
(2.86×10-6)
-8.33×10-6a
(2.72×10-6)
-5.90×10-6a
(1.24×10-6)
f4 -0.02×10-6
(2.04×10-6)
-1.65×10-6
(1.82×10-6)
-1.19×10-6
(1.14×10-6)
-5.87×10-6a
(2.26×10-6)
0.75×10-6
(2.62×10-6)
0.44×10-6
(1.19×10-6)
f5 3.45×10-6
(2.14×10-6)
2.75×10-6
(1.31×10-6)
0.47×10-6
(0.68×10-6)
2.64×10-6
(2.02×10-6)
3.71×10-6b
(1.79×10-6)
2.76×10-6
(1.70×10-6)
Standart errors are in parentheses. Significantly different from zero at 1% (a) , 5% (b) and, 10%(c) level.
Table 2.5 contains results from the iterative estimation of the variance
equation, which is of prime interest for the following reason. If a
conditional variance changes through time in a predictable way, then the
correct modeling of such a variance would yield better estimates of the
parameters in the mean equation. It would improve estimates of
confidence intervals around the mean forecasts as well. Restrictions put
on the coefficients w, a, and b are satisfied, as well as finite conditional
variance condition of a + b < 1. However, Nelson (1991) has shown that
even for a region of parameter value beyond this boundary (e.g. a + b > 1)
the conditional variance process will be strictly stationary and ergodic.
Coefficients of constant w are small and mostly insignificant. Estimates
of lagged squared residuals a and lagged variance b are large and
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comparable with those found in literature. All of them are significantly
different from zero at 1% level. The magnitude of the lagged variance in
all six currencies produce unrefutable evidence of the importance that this
lagged term must be included in the equation of the conditional variance.
The sum of the estimated values of a and b amounts on average to 0.937
for all six currencies. This fact might suggest employment of an Integrated
GARCH(1,1) model. IGARCH model imposes the restriction a + b = 1 on
the coefficients and provides a simpler characterization of exchange rates
in question. However, the IGARCH model imposes complete persistence
of a shock for infinite time horizon. The covariance stationary GARCH
model, on the contrary, implies relatively rapid exponential decay of the
shock. Due to the fact that the currency basket peg dilutes external shocks
in free rates and other influences proportionately according to the weights,
their full impact is eventually damped within a relatively short period of
time. This is fully in accordance with the character of the data, and
therefore, justifies the use of the GARCH model vs. IGARCH. Further
discussion on this subject can be found in Bollerslev and Engle (1993).
Estimates of the day-of-the-week dummy coefficients are fairly small.
Despite this, all six currencies show evidence of systematic daily patterns
in conditional variance. Similar daily effects were reported by Baillie and
Bollerslev (1989) and Hsieh (1988). They are clearly divided into positive
and negative effects across days of the week with corresponding daily
magnitude levels. Monday, Wednesday, and Thursday show a negative
effect while Tuesday, and Holiday show a positive effect. Tuesday’s effect
is evident for four currencies and Wednesday’s effect is clearly visible for
five of them.
The basket peg causes the exchange rates of koruna to lag one day
behind the changes in currencies to which the basket is pegged. This is
because free exchange rates at the market in Frankfurt at time (t) are used
to set the currency basket and exchange rates of koruna at time (t+1). Due
to the one-day-lag, it is a Tuesday’s effect that captures reaction on the
accumulation of information in the financial markets over the weekend.
20
When modeling free exchange rates, it would be Monday’s effect that
should capture this phenomenon because of the lack of a time lag. The
Wednesday’s effect may be understood as a natural correction of the
financial markets after a possible over-reacting on accumulated
information a day before, as seen on Tuesday in free exchange rate
countries.
2.5 Testing the fit of the model
2.5.1 Standard method (Ljung-Box)
The overall fit of the model is assessed by diagnostic tests on standardized
residuals tz  that are constructed as
tttz se /= (2.8)
where te  is the residual of the mean equation (2.5), and ts  is a standard
deviation derived from the estimated conditional variance from (2.6). The
tests and statistics are shown in Table 2.6.
Means are close to zero and variances tend to unity for the exchange
rates residuals. Under these conditions it shows that equations (2.5) and
(2.6) are correctly specified. Ljung-Box tests document that first order
serial dependency is not present at all. Second order dependence is
generally missing as well, however, it is detected at 5% level in
standardized residuals for ATS and FRF. Kurtosis dropped for all
currencies except USD, though, its decrease in case of GBP and DEM was
not large enough to fit into a normal distribution. Kurtosis of ATS, CHF,
and FRF decreased sufficiently to fit into normal distribution.
Table 2.6 Tests on standartized residuals
Statistics GBP ATS DEM USD CHF FRF
Mean 0.006 0.008 0.016 0.003 0.009 0.006
Variance 1.117 1.012 1.056 1.129 1.004 1.004
Skewness -1.284 -0.212 0.017 1.370 0.031 -0.547
Kurtosis 12.795 1.028 3.200 12.436 0.885 1.772
nQ(10) 8.427 2.443 2.522 2.918 1.572 4.411
nQ2(10) 1.637 20.826 4.246 6.152 11.850 19.144
Ljung-Box: critical value of 23.21 from c2 distribution with 10 d.f. at 1% level is used.
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2.5.2 BDS test of the fit
The standardized residuals were also examined with a BDS test of Brock,
Dechert, Scheinkman, and LeBaron (1996). We refer to this test as the
BDS test since this methodology was originally published by Brock,
Dechert, and Scheinkman (1987). The BDS test is a nonparametric test of
null hypothesis that the data is independently and identically distributed
(iid). The technique enables to test for nonlinear dependence and uses the
concept of correlation integral employed by Grassberger and Procaccia
(1983) to distinguish between chaotic deterministic systems and stochastic
systems.
In order to define the correlation integral )(, eTmC , let { }tx be a scalar
time series of lenght T. Then, we form m-dimensional vectors, called m-
histories, ),,,( 11 -++= mttt
m
t xxxx K . Such m-dimensional vectors are used to
calculate the correlation integral at embedding dimension m, which is
given by
))1(/(2),()(
1
1 1
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Thus, the correlation integral measures the fraction of pairs that lie within
the tolerance distance e for the particular spatial dimension m.
The correlation integral is used to define the BDS statistics
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )eseee TmmTTmTm CCTBDS ,,1,, /2
1
-= (2.10)
where T is the sample size, )(, eTmC is the value of a correlation integral or
a number of clustered pairs lying within a particular tolerance distance e at
spatial dimension m, and )(, es Tm is a standard deviation of the statistic
that varies with dimension m. The proximity parameter e is chosen
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arbitrarily and is chiefly enumerated as a ratio of the sample’s standard
deviation.
The BDS test is a nonparametric test of the null hypothesis that the data
is independently and identically distributed (iid) against an unspecified
alternative. The test enables one to test for nonlinear dependence because
it is no affected by linear dependencies in the data. The procedure has
power against both deterministic and stochastic systems. The ability of
this test to deal with stochastic time series makes its application in modern
macroeconomics and financial economics very appealing.
By detecting pairs of histories that cluster together within a specific
range e too often, the BDS test is able to reveal hidden patterns which
should not occur in a truly randomly distributed data. A “pattern”, in this
case, is defined as an occurrence of two histories that lie within a certain
distance e of each other for different spatial dimensions m. Further
detailed explanation and application of the BDS test can be found in the
original paper as well as in numerous studies by Brock and Dechert
(1988), Hsieh and LeBaron (1988), Hsieh (1989), Kugler and Lenz (1990),
Hsieh (1991), Brock, Hsieh and LeBaron (1993), Kugler and Lenz (1993),
Olmeda and Perez (1995), and Kocenda (1996). The software program of
Dechert (1987) was used to compute the BDS statistic.
The BDS test is able to reveal hidden patterns in seemingly random
numbers. This can be illustrated by results from the BDS test performed
on stationary first logarithmic differences to test for the nonlinearity in the
data. Results in Table 2.7 support decisive rejection of the hypothesis that
logarithmic first differences of the exchange rates are iid for all
currencies.
The subsequent application of the BDS test on the standardized residuals
has a strong implication. If the standardized residuals originate from a
correctly specified model of the mean with a correctly specified model of
the conditional variance, then they should not contain any other useful
forecastable structure. In other words standardized residuals derived from
such a model should become white noise.
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Table 2.7 BDS Test: First Logarithmic Differences
m e ATS GBP DEM USD CHF FRF
2 1 8.72* 7.86* 3.70* 1.19 3.64* 4.72*
3 1 10.3* 10.2* 4.11* 1.09 4.18* 5.68*
4 1 11.7* 12.0* 4.90* 1.62 4.88* 6.93*
5 1 12.7* 13.27* 5.62* 2.34* 5.74* 8.12*
6 1 14.21* 14.39* 6.43* 3.19* 6.46* 9.57*
7 1 16.25* 15.28* 7.30* 3.89* 6.92* 11.36*
8 1 18.50* 16.23* 8.06* 4.46* 7.28* 12.76*
9 1 21.13* 17.26* 9.10* 5.06* 7.48* 14.36*
10 1 24.01* 18.40* 10.32* 5.56* 7.45* 15.87*
2 1/2 2.87* 6.27* 3.69* 1.91 3.35* 7.18*
3 1/2 2.68* 7.80* 3.83* 1.74 4.06* 8.59*
4 1/2 2.39* 9.31* 4.48* 2.19 4.56* 10.45*
5 1/2 1.96 10.20* 5.03* 2.61* 4.84* 12.35*
6 1/2 2.18 10.88* 5.36* 3.31* 4.92* 15.89*
7 1/2 3.10* 11.28* 6.24* 2.65* 6.03* 21.01*
8 1/2 3.34* 11.73* 5.27* 3.81* 6.06* 26.91*
9 1/2 5.16* 12.67* 2.99* 3.19* 4.37* 35.85*
10 1/2 6.82* 13.43* 1.60 8.44* -2.66 50.24*
BDS follows t-distribution. * indicates 1% significance level (> 2.33).
Table 2.8 BDS tests of nonlinearity: Standardized Residuals GARCH(1,1)
M e GBP ATS DEM USD CHF FRF
2 1 -1.92 -0.51 -1.10 -0.84 0.79 -0.53
3 1 -2.02* -0.68 -1.37 -1.27 0.75 -1.09
4 1 -1.61* -0.47 -1.37 -1.43* 0.79 -1.23
5 1 -1.78* -0.66 -1.35 -1.50* 0.98 -1.20
10 1 -2.63* -0.64 -1.46 -1.15 0.23 -0.94
2 0.5 -1.95 0.20 -0.51 -1.26 1.01 -0.87
3 0.5 -2.09* 0.21 -1.02 -1.73 0.84 -1.37
4 0.5 -1.71 -0.01 -0.97 -1.80 0.92 -1.38
5 0.5 -2.11 -0.37 -0.93 -1.86 0.27 -1.72
10 0.5 -1.14 4.99 -0.60 -1.72 -4.48 -2.21
BDS: critical values in a  form of Qantiles of BDS Statistic
are provided in a separate Table 9
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Table 2.9 Quantiles of  BDS Statistic GARCH(1,1) Standardized Residuals
1000 observations
Quantile m
2 3 4 5 10 N(0,1)
e=1.0s
1.0% -1.97 -1.64 -1.42 -1.45 -1.66 -2.33
2.5% -1.69 -1.41 -1.26 -1.20 -1.46 -1.96
97.5% 1.63 1.42 1.32 1.23 1.75 1.96
99.0% 2.01 1.78 1.61 1.51 2.23 2.33
e=0.5s
1.0% -2.11 -1.96 -2.09 -2.45 -7.31 -2.33
2.5% -1.84 -1.72 -1.80 -2.05 -6.93 -1.96
97.5% 1.80 1.79 1.92 2.19 16.83 1.96
99.0% 2.29 2.18 2.25 2.69 23.48 2.33
Based on 2000 replications
Source: Brock, Hsieh, and LeBaron (1993), p. 278
Table 2.8 shows the results of the BDS test on standardized residuals. The
results can be interpreted with the help of Table 2.9 which contains
quantiles of the BDS statistic of standardized residuals from GARCH(1,1)
model of exchange rates. The asymmetric distribution was derived by
Brock, Hsieh, and LeBaron (1993), p.278, after 2000 replications (the
table, however, states values for e=1 and 0.5 only). For tolerance distance
e=1 the test reveals no evidence of nonlinear dependence for four
currencies: ATS, DEM, CHF, and FRF. However, the critical values are
exceeded for spatial dimensions m=3,4,5, and 10 in case of GBP which
shows rather high values for all dimensions in any event, and for m=4, and
5 in case of USD. This indicates the existence of a more complex
dimensional structure governing the behavior of these particular rates. In
case of USD it is a marginal decision though. A missing nonlinear term is
to be added to better the model. At tolerance distance e=0.5 a nonlinear
dependence is not detected in general. The critical value is exceeded at the
dimensional level of m=3 in rate of GBP. In no case is the critical value
exceeded at the highest dimensional level. If it were, it would have been
for a different reason. As spatial dimension m increases, the number of
pairs of histories that lie within the distance e decreases rapidly. The lack
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of available data, therefore, causes the test to go beyond the statistical
range and distortions are likely to occur.
It can be concluded that the model fits all six currencies very well, but
GBP requires some nonlinear improvement. Diagnostic tests show that
GARCH(1,1) model is capable of accounting for most of the nonlinearity
in the particular set of exchange rates.
2.6 Empirical summary
Exchange rates of the Czech koruna to six major currencies evolved
relatively stable through the researched period. Due to their dependency
on the currency basket, they are of a semi-fixed character. They showed
remarkable similarities in behavior and statistical characteristics with
those exchange rates that are free to float. This is to be attributed to the
consistent policy of the central bank that kept the basket index relatively
unchanged within the ± 0.5% band. The exchange rates achieved
stationarity after the first logarithmic differencing and were shown not to
be identically and independently distributed. Their conditional first
moments are linearly independent. However, non-linear dependency was
detected in conditional second moments. These facts along with a
Lagrange-multiplier test confirmed the presence of an ARCH process in
the data.
GARCH(1,1) model was employed to capture the properties of the
exchange rates and to model their conditional variance along with the day-
of-the-week effects. Mean equation of the model exhibits a strong
statistical significance at the tenth lag level which indicates a two business
week memory of the market. Variance equation shows highly significant
coefficients of lagged residuals and own variance. Altogether it is shown
that change in a rate is very closely related to its conditional variance.
Strong Wednesday and Tuesday effects uncover a significant sequential
responsiveness to the information flow within financial markets.
Tests performed on the standardized residuals from the GARCH(1,1)
model revealed nonexistence of both first and second order serial
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dependency. However, the latter was detected at 5% level for two
currencies. The model accounted for decrease in kurtosis for five
currencies, although marginally in two cases.
An advanced nonparametric BDS test revealed existence of nonlinear
dependency in exchange rates. Standardized residuals, on the contrary,
revealed a lack of such a dependency and become white noise. The only
exception is GBP (and marginally USD), where a nonlinear component
should be added to improve the model. The particular model accounted
for most of the nonlinearity in the data and other nonlinear model is not
likely to be able to pick up more of the forecastable structure from a time
series.
The application of conditional heteroskedasticity proved to be an
efficient tool to analyze semi-fixed exchange rates managed under strict
discipline. Combined results of the analysis showed that the Czech
National Bank managed to mantain exchange rate of the Czech koruna
without subjective tampering. Doing so, the rates were able to fully reflect
influences of the currencies in the currency basket. A similar approach
could be used in examining other (transition) economies that choose to
impose such a strict discipline and peg their currencies using a fixed
exchange rate arrangement of a similar fashion.
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3 Volatility of exchange rate with change in
fluctuation band
3.1 Altered band
This part extends the analysis of exchange rate and examines the behavior
of the Czech koruna when it was pegged to a currency basket under
different fluctuation bands. The period of our interest starts after the
monetary separation of the Czech and Slovak republics in the beginning of
1993 until the end of 1996. It offers a different angle of application of
generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity to analyze a
currency movement. In chapter 2 we outlined monetary environment in
which the exchange rate of the koruna evolved since 1991.
Most importantly we stated that the koruna could not be openly traded
for several years and its full was instituted convertibility on October 1,
1995. This measure meant that the koruna could be traded for foreign
exchange without restrictions by both companies and citizens. However,
this step was not paired with any kind of change in the exchange rate
regime itself.
Such a change happened in 1996 and concerns the fluctuation band. The
fluctuation band imposed on the currency basket was originally set at ±
0.5% (narrow band period). It was widened on February 28, 1996 to allow
the index to fluctuate by ± 7.5% (wide band period). By allowing for a
wider fluctuation band, the CNB let the exchange rate fluctuate more
freely, thus reducing its potential nominal stability. Because of the fact
that the currency basket was introduced to keep a relatively stable nominal
exchange rate, a further implication is that allowing for a wider
fluctuation band should lead to more pronounced movements and
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increased volatility of the koruna. Whether this is true is addressed in the
following analysis that starts with data description.
3.2 Data
The data consists of daily midpoint exchange rates of the Czech koruna
(CZK) to six major currencies from January 4, 1993 to December 31,
1996. The data was supplied by the Czech National Bank (CNB), Prague.
The rates of foreign currencies in terms of the Czech koruna are: Deutsche
Mark (DEM), U.S. Dollar (USD), British pound (GBP), Canadian dollar
(CAD), Japanese yen (JPY), and Swedish kron (SEK). The six major
currencies were selected for this study because the majority of them are
quite important in international trade (USD, GBP, JPY), and some of them
are included in the currency basket to which the Czech koruna was pegged
(USD, DEM). Another reason is that they represent a set of currencies that
are governed by different exchange rate regimes: from a real free float
(USD, CAD, JPY) to a more limited float or interlinked peg (DEM, SEK,
GBP). A significant reason for analyzing CAD, JPY, GBP, and SEK is the
fact that these currencies were not in any formal way associated with the
composition of the basket during the researched period.
There are a total of 1016 daily observations for each currency. The data
are not stationary but represent a first order integrated process. A further
analysis is performed on the rate of change of respective exchange rates
calculated as a percentual change between two consecutive business days.
Such a transformed time series exhibits the usual mean close to zero and
skewness and kurtosis far from normality, as one would expect in the case
of high frequency financial data.
The change in the fluctuation band allows us to divide the whole span of
data into two periods. The first one covers the period from January 4,
1993 to February 27, 1996, and has 804 observations. The latter one, with
212 observations, covers the rest of the data until the end of 1996. From
the data we reconstructed evolution of the currency basket index exactly
the same way as in section 2.2. The CNB managed to keep the index of
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the basket within the band during both periods. However, minor incidents
of mismanagement occurred, as can be seen in Figure 3.1. Again, it should
be stressed that the index, calculated from daily midpoint exchange rates,
serves only as an illustration of how it evolved over time.
Figure 3.1
 Evolution of the Currency Basket Index
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3.3 Leverage effect
As before we use the autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity
(ARCH) model specified by Engle (1982) as an effective approach to
modeling volatility. Particularly we use the extension of Bollerslev (1986)
who put the original framework forth to a generalized autoregressive
conditional heteroskedasticity model (GARCH) where current volatility
depends not only on past squared residuals but also on a lagged
autoregressive component, e.g. lagged own variances. By deriving
residuals te  from an underlying process, which are conditioned by the
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information set tW , a GARCH(p,q) process is given by
),0(~| 21 ttt N se -W  with conditional autoregressive variance specified as
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Research done with exchange rates and security prices uses random
walk as well as different univariate processes to model underlying
movement in the data. When taking into account the basket pegged
character of the exchange rates in the data set and having performed
several tests, we opted for an autoregressive process to model the
underlying movement in the data. The number of lags was determined to
be 1, 1, 3, 1, 1, and 2 for DEM, USD, GBP, CAD, JPY and SEK,
respectively. The mean equation was specified as
titr e+å -
k
1=i
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where, ),0(~| 21 ttt D se -W .
In order to analyze volatility of the koruna the following concept was
introduced. A change in volatility is analyzed with the use of a
phenomenon known as a “leverage effect,” which is the negative
correlation between volatility and past returns. Following the
parametrization of Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle (1993) and its
application by Engle and Ng (1993) and Hamilton and Susmel (1994), the
variance equation was specified as
 21-t1
2
1
2
1
2 exsbeaws ××+×+×+= --- tttt d (3.3)
where  1-td is a dummy variable that is equal to zero if 01 >-te , and equal
to unity if 01 £-te . The leverage effect predicts that 0>x . The
restrictions on the parameters in the variance equation require that 0>w ,
0³a , and 0³b . Further, when 1<+ ba , then the unconditional
variance is finite and stationarity is ensured by not having unit root, as
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shown by Bollerslev (1986). The above specification yields the GARCH-
L(1,1) model that is estimated later.
The leverage effect was analyzed in stock price movements. For
example, in the case of equities, Black (1976) and Nelson (1991), among
others, argued that a stock price decrease tends to increase subsequent
volatility by more than would a stock price increase of the same
magnitude. In the case of the exchange rate, the leverage effect represents
the fact that a decrease in the price of a foreign currency in terms of the
koruna, or the koruna’s appreciation, would tend to increase the
subsequent volatility of the koruna more than would a depreciation of an
equal magnitude. Despite the fact that holding foreign exchange is, in
terms of risk, similar to holding equities, literature dealing with the
“leverage effect” in the context of exchange rate fluctuation is still
lacking.
 While the value of the statistically significant leverage coefficient x
indicates the magnitude of the leverage effect, the sign implies its
direction. A positive value of the coefficient x  indicates an increase, and a
negative coefficient indicates a decrease in subsequent volatility of the
exchange rate. By comparing values and signs of statistically significant
leverage coefficients for a particular exchange rate in the two separate
periods of narrow and wide fluctuation bands, it is possible to comment on
the effect of the fluctuation band change on the koruna’s volatility.
3.4 Leverage effect empirics in exchange rate
An estimation of the model was performed by using a log-likelihood
function of the form ( )( )2221221 /ln tttL ses --= . The maximum
likelihood estimates were obtained by using a numerical optimization
algorithm described by Berndt, Hall, Hall, and Hausman (1974). The
results from the estimation are presented in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 for
narrow and wide fluctuation band periods respectively.
Coefficients of the mean equation reveal a small and mostly
insignificant intercept for both periods. Lagged rates are mostly
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insignificant in the first period but highly significant in the later one. The
second period dominates the whole process and the number of lags in the
AR model is kept the same in both periods for the sake of consistency.
Table 3.1
 Estimating GARCH-L (1,1): First (Narrow Band) Period
Estimates and statistics DEM USD GBP CAD JPY SEK
a0 0.00006
(0.00009)
-0.00009
(0.00015)
0.00059
(0.00091)
-0.00018
(0.00020)
0.00014
(0.00021)
0.00001
(0.0021)
a1 -0.135a
(0.035)
-0.039
(0.035)
-0.553a
(0.035)
-0.018
(0.035)
0.028
(0.035)
0.004
(0.035)
a2 - - -0.292a
(0.039)
- - -0.113a
(0.035)
a3 - - -0.122a
(0.035)
- - -
w 2.01×10-6a
(0.51×10-6)
7.29×10-7a
(1.50×10-7)
0.00059
(0.00052)
0.00011a
(0.00003)
0.00001a
(0.000003)
0.00012a
(0.000017)
a 0.059a
(0.019)
0.004
(0.009)
0.165
(0.174)
0.005
(0.012)
0.103a
(0.018)
0.024
(0.033)
b 0.886a
(0.030)
0.922a
(0.016)
0.822a
(0.159)
0.933a
(0.017)
0.893a
(0.017)
0.554a
(0.061)
x -0.167a
(0.023)
0.079a
(0.017)
-0.567
(0.503)
0.062a
(0.018)
-0.054a
(0.021)
0.217a
(0.055)
Standard errors are in parentheses. Significantly different from zero at 1% (a) , 5% (b) and, 10%(c) level.
In the case of the variance equation, coefficients of constant w are small
and mostly insignificant. Estimates of lagged squared residuals a and
lagged variance b are generally large and comparable with those found in
the literature. Nearly all of them are significantly different from zero at 5
or 10% level; however, 1% level significance predominates. The
magnitude of the lagged variance in most of the currencies provides
irrefutable evidence of the importance of including this lagged term in the
equation of the conditional variance.
The focal results of this paper are provided by comparing the leverage
effect coefficients. The focus is naturally on the DEM and USD. In both
periods the Deutsche mark shows quite a large negative coefficient which
increased roughly by one third from one period to another. The volatility
of this exchange rate tends to decrease during the wide band period. The
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dollar starts with a relatively small positive coefficient for the first period
and ends up with an almost equal coefficient of the negative sign in the
second one. This represents a significant change in the behavior of this
exchange rate as well as the tendency for the volatility to decrease during
the wide band period as in the case of the Deutsche mark.
Table 3.2
 Estimating GARCH-L (1,1): Second (Wide Band) Period
Estimates and statistics DEM USD GBP CAD JPY SEK
a0 -0.00030
(0.00026)
-0.00009
(0.00029)
0.00052
(0.00034)
0.00013
(0.00037)
-0.00047
(0.00041)
-0.00006
(0.00031)
a1 -0.199a
(0.067)
-0.148a
(0.068)
-0.041
(0.070)
-0.218a
(0.067)
-0.118c
(0.069)
-0.054
(0.069)
a2 - - 0.042
(0.071)
- - 0.041a
(0.069)
a3 - - -0.012
(0.070)
- - -
w 0.87×10-6a
(0.27×10-6)
2.66×10-5a
(1.69×10-6)
0.41×10-6a
(0.04×10-6)
0.00042a
(0.00002)
0.00001a
(0.000003)
0.00001c
(0.000078)
a 0.140a
(0.045)
0.182a
(0.044)
0.023a
(0.007)
0.148a
(0.073)
0.031b
(0.016)
0.217b
(0.101)
b 0.807a
(0.022)
0.750a
(0.102)
0.940a
(0.004)
0.812a
(0.073)
0.941a
(0.061)
0.756a
(0.061)
x -0.221a
(0.066)
-0.082c
(0.049)
-0.059a
(0.015)
-0.054
(0.624)
-0.430a
(0.244)
-0.242b
(0.125)
Standard errors are in parentheses. Significantly different from zero at 1% (a) , 5% (b) and, 10%(c) level.
What happened in the case of the other currencies? The exchange rate of
the Japanese yen records an increase of the negative leverage coefficient.
The British pound, on the other hand, exhibits a decrease of the negative
leverage coefficient. The coefficient is however, statistically insignificant
in the first period, so any strong statement concerning intertemporal
comparison is precluded. A similar situation regards the Canadian dollar,
which starts with a positive coefficient and ends with a negative one in the
wide band period. The latter one is statistically insignificant, though. The
Swedish koruna shows a change in the behavior of the exchange rate since
it starts with a positive leverage coefficient but records a negative one
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later. This indicates a considerable decrease in volatility for this exchange
rate.
The results of the analysis clearly indicate that allowing for the wider
fluctuation band resulted in a decrease in volatility of the key currencies
(DEM and USD), as well as of two other ones (JPY and SEK). An analysis
of the other two currencies (GBP and CAD) is unfortunately precluded by
the lack of statistical significance associated with the leverage effect
coefficient in the broad or wide band periods respectively. One possible
explanation might be the fact that the key currencies (DEM and USD),
being a part of the currency basket, affect themselves directly. Their
movements actually counteract each other because their influences
represented by weights in the basket must be strictly balanced in order to
keep the basket index constant. However, the wide fluctuation band
allows relatively far deviations from this target. This is empirically
documented by the evolution of the index that stayed almost entirely
within the appreciation part of the fluctuation band during the wide band
period (see Figure 3.1).
The currencies that are not part of the basket are affected indirectly by a
simple mechanical calculation of their exchange rate for each respective
day. Their diminished volatility associated with a wider fluctuation band
then goes against conventional wisdom, which is documented in some
previously published work. Flood and Rose (1995) claim that “fixed
exchange rates are less volatile than floating rates, but the volatility of
macroeconomic variables such as money and output does not change very
much across exchange rate regimes.” Hasan and Wallace (1996) argue
that using long-term data “real exchange rate volatility is greater for
flexible exchange rate periods than for fixed-rate periods.”
3.5 Brief summary
The exchange rate of the Czech koruna pegged to a currency basket was
analyzed. The change of the value of the basket is measured by its index.
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The central point of the analysis is how the change in the fluctuation band
of the index affected volatility of the exchange rate.
By allowing for a wider fluctuation band, the CNB let the exchange rate
fluctuate more freely, thus reducing its potential nominal stability.
Because of the fact that the currency basket was introduced to keep a
relatively stable nominal exchange rate and limit its volatility, a further
implication is that allowing for a wider fluctuation band should lead to
more pronounced movements and increased volatility of the koruna.
The analysis showed that, against conventional wisdom, the volatility of
the exchange rate diminished after a much wider fluctuation band was
introduced. Particularly, the results of the analysis clearly indicate that
allowing for a wider fluctuation band resulted in a decrease in volatility of
the key currencies (DEM and USD). Two other currencies (JPY and SEK)
exhibited decreased volatility, after the narrow fluctuation band was
abolished, as well.
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4 Intratemporal links among interest and exchange
rates*
4.1 Basic facts
Chapters 2 and 3 presented some economic and institutional background of
the exchange rate regime that governed the behavior of the Czech koruna
from the early 90’s. Since exchange rate regime is an important element in the
overall monetary policy of each country, it transfers a great deal of influence
into the financial market. Such an influence is often likely to be indirect via
interest rates. Our goal in this part is to assess the money market in the Czech
Republic and to study the interactions between short and long interest rates,
and specifically a lead-lag relationship. In particular, we will study linkages
between interest rates, as well as exchange rates, and compare the results of
the periods before 1997 with those in the year when the country experienced
financial crisis. Despite the fact that the turbulence in the mid of 1997 was
officially labeled as a financial crisis, in the view of what happened on a
global scale in 1998 such term should be understood with caution.
As we said before, former Czechoslovakia officially started its economic
transformation in 1991. The temporary anchor of an exchange rate regime
based on a currency basket peg with a new level of base rates was
introduced in 1991 as a part of overall transformation strategy. Czech koruna
emerged after the split of the country into two independent nations followed
shortly by the formal monetary separation. Over the years several important
changes took place. First, the Czech National Bank (CNB) changed the
composition of the basket on January 2, 1992, and then on May 2, 1993.
From the latter date on, the basket was composed of the US dollar and the
Deutsche mark at a ratio of 35:65. Second, there was a
                                       
* This chapter was written with Jan Hanousek.
37
change of the fluctuation band. The band imposed on the basket was
originally set at ± 0.5%. It was widened on February 28, 1996, to allow the
index to fluctuate by ± 7.5%, while the exchange rate was still kept within
the fixed regime. Previous chapters dealt with this subject in detail.
During the period from 1991 to 1996 the koruna evolved in a relatively
stable manner. The stability was interrupted in 1997.
From the very beginning of 1997 the exchange rate started to appreciate
significantly. In the middle of February it reached a local maximum of
5.5% above a central parity, and from then on it steadily depreciated. At
first the fall was not very sharp and the rate even became steady in the
beginning of May. A strong speculative pressure had emerged by the
middle of May. CNB fought the speculative attacks for roughly two weeks
with the help of foreign exchange interventions and with a sharp increase
in interest rates. Then on May 26, 1997, the CNB abandoned the fixed
exchange rate regime and let the koruna float freely with some unspecified
tie to the Deutsche mark. The koruna immediately devalued by 12-13%.
This dive stopped quite quickly, and subsequently the koruna strengthened
and moved into the lower range of the original parity.
The devaluation of the koruna acted as a natural pro-export feature and
hurt the economy only mildly. The sharp increase in interest rates was the
damaging factor, instead. The CNB ceased performing repo operations on
May 15, 1997, and set a floating repo rate, which was dependent on the
current market situation. The rates rose slightly. On May 16, 1997, the
CNB increased the lombard rate from 14 to 50%, and during the next
week it started to lower market liquidity with a 45 and later 75% repo rate.
As a result of such strict monetary policy, short-term interest rates on the
inter-bank market reached an unbelievable 200% and even peaked above
400%. Commercial banks were cut off from liquidity and acted
accordingly. Tied to the subsequent appreciation of the currency, interest
rates decreased but did not reach original levels.
The relatively stable environment of the fixed exchange rate regime and
semi-regulated interest rates in the early 90’s provided a soft environment
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for the evolution of links among key interest rates. The bonds among
interest rates tended to evolve in a weak economic sense. They naturally
changed from 1993, when a modern banking sector emerged in the
country. In 1996 these links were found to be quite independent. The
peaceful evolution lasted till the beginning of 1997. Then turbulence
started to sweep the entire industry and to erode the original arrangements.
It is not our purpose to discuss whether the interest rates were correctly
or incorrectly set during the crisis. Rather we would like to take the
interest rate settings as exogenous shocks and analyze what their impact
was. The great exogenous shocks might have great effect on links among
interest rates at the inter-bank market and the position of its leading rate.
Similar links are expected to exist between the exchange rate and interest
rates.
4.2 Vector autoregresive analysis of lead-lag relationship
A usual vector autoregressive process (VAR) specification is
tmtYmAtYAAtY E+-++-×+= ...110 , (4.1)
where Y is a list of macroeconomic variables. A VAR is a non-structural
model which simply estimates how variables are related to their lagged
values over time. VAR models have been used extensively, in particular in
macroeconomic forecasting. Several authors give a strong critique of
structural models, arguing that VAR works better for forecasting and for
policy evaluation (see Litterman (1979) and Sims (1980) among others).
On the other hand, VAR specification represents a reduced form of a
structural model.
Since Granger (1969) introduced his definition of “causality,” (see also
Sims (1980)) the test of Granger-type causality has been applied quite
frequently in a variety of empirical papers, including studies on market
links. The methodology for testing linkages between markets is quite
standard and was extensively used by Agmon (1972), Hiemstra and Jones
(1994), Hsiao (1981), Joy et al. (1976), Kwan et al. (1995), and Smith et
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al. (1993) among others. A similar approach has been used to test
interrelations between the cash market and stock index futures by Chan
(1992) and Kawaller et al. (1987), to mention a few.
The described model fits our goal of studying the efficiency of the newly
established inter-bank market in the Czech Republic. The interactions
between short and long interest rates, and specifically a lead-lag
relationship, are our general interest. In particular, we intend to study
linkages between interest rates, and later between exchange rates and
interest rates.
If the inter-bank market is efficient, then arbitrage and base trading will
maintain the correct pricing relationship. This lead-lag relationship can be
attributed to several specific factors of the Czech inter-bank market: the
unsettled character of the new market, the low volume of trade for some
maturities, and institutional design. While strong bilateral links support
the hypothesis of market integration, a unilateral link leads to market
segmentation and arbitrage opportunities.
To test such a hypothesis we use the tool of Granger causality. We say
that “ }{ tx  Granger causes }{ ty ,” when the lagged values of tx  have an
explanatory power in regression of ty  on lagged values of ty  and tx . The
Granger causality is then tested via an autoregressive representation:
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For a review of alternative tests see Geweke et al. (1983).
Because disturbances are serially uncorrelated, the direction of causality
between {xt} and {yt} can be turned into a standard test of whether b(L)=0
and/or c(L)=0. The test of the hypothesis “ }{ tx  Granger causes }{ ty ” is
equivalent to the test of the restriction b(L)=0. Similarly, the opposite
direction of causality can be tested via the restriction  c(L)=0.
The testing can proceed only if some restrictions on the autoregressive
form (4.2) are specified before the actual estimation is done. For instance,
we should identify the length of autoregression prior to estimation of (4.2).
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We applied Hsiao's (1981) two-step approach to determine the length of
the lag structure. The linkages between inter-bank interest rates were
examined in the context of the following models:
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0 , (4.4)
where X t  and Yt  denote interest rates associated with different maturity.
For each maturity the proper pair of lag lengths ),( 21 kk  and ),( 43 kk
were specified using a search method over a range of lag lengths from 1 to
10. The choice of the optimal lengths was based on standard information
criteria of Akaike (1969), Hannan-Quinn (1979), and Schwarz (1978).
Thorton and Batetten (1985) show the sensitivity of the causal
relationships (links) to the chosen number of lags. In particular, it is
necessary to test whether both series are cointegrated. Such testing is
extensively illustrated by the standard methodology developed by Engle
and Granger (1987).
 Therefore, we did several robust checks, using the number of lags
recommended by different information criteria. Moreover, we used six
and seven lags of both the dependent and independent variables to test for
market linkages. In all cases, we obtained the same results. Because the
error terms were not autocorrelated and cointegration was not rejected for
any equation, we tested the lead-lag relationship between the interest rates
by stating the following hypothesizes:
H0 : b i = 0  for all i, which means that there is no link from maturity Y to
X
and
H0 : d i = 0  for all i, which means that there is no link from maturity X to
Y.
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4.3 Data
All the data we used were provided by the CNB. We used daily exchange
rates of the koruna in terms of the US dollar and the Deutsche mark.
Further we used daily interest rates for different maturities. One is the
Prague Interbank Offer Rate (PRIBOR); the other is the Prague
Interbank Bid Rate (PRIBID). Both rates were used in price quotations
for: one day, one week, two weeks, one month, two months, three months,
six months, nine months, and one year. We are aware of the fact that a one
day rate is known to behave rather strangely sometime. However, we
included this rate to cover the entire range of interest rates on the
interbank market.
There was a total of 1131 observations, which were divided according to
years in the following manner: 1993 with 229 observations, 1994 with 247
observations, 1995 with 245 observations, 1996 with 245 observations,
and 1997 with 165 observations. The years from 1993 to 1996 cover 12
months each. The data for 1997 covers a period of nine months.
As one might expect, the data are the first order integrated process. The
analysis is therefore performed on the changes in exchange and interest
rates between two consecutive business days.
4.4 Intratemporal linkages
4.4.1 Overall inter-bank performance
The overall performance of the inter-bank rates from 1993 to the end of
September 1997 is illustrated in Figure 4.1. For the sake of simplicity, the
magnitudes of the inter-bank rates are presented only for the overnight
rate. The picture shows a large peak during the financial crisis. A more
important observation is that despite significant differences in the inflation
rate during the period prior to the financial crisis, the interest rate was
quite stable. In real terms, the rate was significantly negative and
significantly below prime rates for the majority of Czech banks. The main
point is that during the time of notably different inflation rates, the interest
rate was kept more or less constant.
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Figure 4.1 One Day Offer Rate on the Prague Inter-bank Market:
January 3, 1993 to September 30, 1997
It is very useful to look at the spread, which is defined as the difference
between offer and bid rate. The spread is often used as a proxy to measure
the degree of stability on the market. Figure 4.2 shows the evolution of
short-term interest rate spreads on the inter-bank market from January 3,
1993, to May 16, 1997, just immediately prior to the crisis. It can be
concluded that the period before the crisis was characterized by a notable
decline in spreads. This can be translated into low uncertainty in and low
volatility of the money market.
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Figure 4.2 Short Term Interest Rate Spreads on the Prague Inter-bank Market:
January 3, 1993 to May 16, 1997
4.4.2 Links among interest rates
The following part of the paper points out the major elements of the
monetary policy during the transformation. Further it brings the results of
the quantitative analysis of the links among interest rates at the inter-bank
market together with the comments.
In the beginning of 1993 the CNB stressed free reserve regulation in the
banking system. Interest rates on the inter-bank deposit market rose until
the middle of April. Relaxation of monetary policy starting in April led to
a gradual decline in interest rates which continued until the end of the
year. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show that the leading rate for bids was one week,
while the leading rate for offers ranged from one month to six months.
This might imply that interest was primarily in long money. The one-day
rate had no meaning in this year, while the nine-month and one-year rates
had not yet been introduced.
In 1994 developments on the money market were affected mainly by
continuing foreign capital inflows and the CNB employed free market
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operations. Beginning in the second half of the year, interest rates
increased.
Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 show that leading rates for both bids and offers
were one-week rates. Similarly, in the case of both rates, the nine-month
rate showed a tendency to affect market links as well. As for offers, the
two-week rate had some impact too. As before, the one-day rate had no
impact.
Table 4.1 1993: Bid
1D 1W 2W 1M 2M 3M 6M 9M 1Y
1D
1W ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A
2W ®A ®B ®A ®B ®B
1M ®A ®B ®B ®B
2M ®A ®B ®A ®A
3M ®B
6M ®A
Table 4.2 1993: Offer
1D 1W 2W 1M 2M 3M 6M 9M 1Y
1D
1W ®A ®A ®B ®A ®B
2W ®A ®A ®B ®B
1M ®A ®B ®B ®A ®A ®A
2M ®A ®A ®B ®A ®A ®A
3M ®A ®A ®B ®A ®A ®A
6M ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A
Table 4.3 1994: Bid
1D 1W 2W 1M 2M 3M 6M 9M 1Y
1D ®B
1W ®A ®B ®A ®B ®A ®B ®A
2W ®A ®A ®A
1M ®A ®A ®A ®B ®A
2M ®A ®A ®A
3M ®A ®A
6M ®A ®B ®A ®B
9M ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A
1Y ®A ®A
Table 4.4 1994: Offer
1D 1W 2W 1M 2M 3M 6M 9M 1Y
1D
1W ®A ®B ®A ®A ®A ®A
2W ®A ®B ®A ®A ®A
1M ®A ®A ®A ®A
2M
3M ®A ®A ®A
6M ®A ®A ®A ®A
9M ®A ®A ®A ®B ®A
1Y
®A means the direction of a causality link at 1% significance level
®B means the direction of a causality link at 5% significance level
In 1995 foreign capital inflow affected the decline in money market
interest rates. The CNB used a range of operations to sterilize the impact
of this inflow on money market interest rates. Interest rates on total credits
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and deposits changed little throughout the year. Real interest rates on new
credits and time deposits increased. An analysis of this year provides a
disquieting view, which is illustrated by Tables 4.5 and 4.6. The market
links weakened instead of strengthening. Weekly rates were no longer
linked and one-day rates began to tie themselves to one and two-week
rates. Other linkages show that short-term weekly rates were becoming
leading rates. This might reflect an already emerging uncertainty in the
economy.  Long money definitely started to lose its position.
Table 4.5 1995: Bid
1D 1W 2W 1M 2M 3M 6M 9M 1Y
1D ®A ®A ®B
1W ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A
2W ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A
1M ®A ®B ®B ®A
2M ®A ®A
3M ®A ®B ®B ®A
6M ®A ®A
9M ®A
1Y ®A ®A ®A ®A
Table 4.6 1995: Offer
1D 1W 2W 1M 2M 3M 6M 9M 1Y
1D ®B ®B
1W ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A ®B ®A
2W ®A ®A ®A ®B ®A ®A ®A
1M ®A ®A ®B ®B
2M ®A ®A
3M ®A ®A ®B ®B
6M ®A ®A ®B
9M ®A ®A
1Y ®A ®A
Table 4.7 1996: Bid
1D 1W 2W 1M 2M 3M 6M 9M 1Y
1D
1W ®A
2W ®A
1M ®A
2M ®A
3M ®A
6M ®A
9M
1Y ®A
Table 4.8 1996: Offer
1D 1W 2W 1M 2M 3M 6M 9M 1Y
1D
1W ®A
2W ®A
1M ®A ®A
2M ®A ®A
3M ®A ®A
6M ®A ®A
9M ®A ®A+
1Y ®A ®A
®A means the direction of a causality link at 1% significance level
®B means the direction of a causality link at 5% significance level
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In 1996 foreign capital inflow had a smaller effect on money market
interest rates. Turnover on the inter-bank deposit market grew
substantially. The issue of the year, tighter monetary policy, resulted in an
increase in interest rates. Tables 4.7 and 4.8 reveal surprising outcome.
The interest rates lack any substantial link and, in plain fact, are not linked
among themselves at all. This fact cannot be changed by a slightly better
result in the case of offer rates. The outcome might very well have been
caused by the small bank crisis that erupted in 1995. The deviant structure
on the money market had possibly led to the bizarre situation in which the
question of “to whom a bank would lend” was more important than the
question of what the price of the loan should be. This is exactly when
interest rates failed to give information essential to correct functioning of
the money market. They stopped being the price of money.
Table 4.9 1997: Bid
1D 1W 2W 1M 2M 3M 6M 9M 1Y
1D ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A
1W ®A ®A ®B ®A ®A ®B ®A
2W ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A
1M ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A
2M ®A ®A ®B ®A ®A ®A ®A
3M ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A
6M ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A
9M ®A ®B ®B ®A
1Y ®A ®B ®A ®B ®A ®A
Table 4.10 1997: Offer
1D 1W 2W 1M 2M 3M 6M 9M 1Y
1D ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A ®B
1W ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A
2W ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A
1M ®A ®A ®A ®B ®B
2M ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A ®B
3M ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A ®B ®B
6M ®A ®A ®A ®A ®B ®A
9M ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A
1Y ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A ®A
®A means the direction of a causality link at 1% significance level
®B means the direction of a causality link at 5% significance level
So far, 1997 has been the most dramatic year on the money market since
the beginning of the transformation. The koruna has become the most
traded currency of all transition countries. Interest rates were relatively
stable at the beginning of the year. A financial crisis prompted their rise
and stirred the foreign exchange market considerably. The fixed exchange
rate regime was abandoned, but mild foreign exchange interventions
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remained on the agenda almost daily. Interest rates declined only slowly
because of the reluctance of the CNB. The unprecedented uncertainty that
started to peak during the financial crisis in the middle of the year is
implicitly portrayed in Tables 4.9 and 4.10. The mutual links among
interest rates are visibly abundant among almost all interest rates. Two-
way links show that one-week and two-week interest rates lost their
exclusive position on the market.
Figure 4.3 Short Term Interest Rate Spreads on the Prague Inter-bank Market:
May 17, 1997 to June 30, 1997
Again we examine the interest rate spread. Figure 4.3 presents the
evolution of short-term interest rate spreads on the inter-bank market
from May 17, 1997, to June 30, 1997. Naturally the magnitudes are very
different than those before the crisis. The uncertainty in the market
increased dramatically. The period after the crisis, from July 1, 1997, to
September 30, 1997, is illustrated in Figure 4.4. This period showed a
decrease in the interest rate spreads. However, the sudden gaps in spreads
suggest that the market was still very sensitive to external shocks and the
stability of the market was not comparable to the stability before the
crisis.
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Figure 4.4 Short Term Interest Rate Spreads on the Prague Inter-bank Market:
July 1, 1997 to September 30, 1997
Table 4.11 Links among Exchange and Interest Rates: 1997
Rate Causality, F-value Currency Causality, F-value Rate
1 Day
7.64 × Ø 11.5
1 Day
Ø 3.69 3.24 ×
1 Week
9.76 × Ø 15.3
1 Week
Ø 3.29 3.79 ×
2 Week
8.89 × Ø 12.5
2 Week
Ø 4.25 4.81 ×
1 Month
7.69 × Ø 9.51
1 Month
Ó 2.14 2.09 
2 Month
8.97 × Ø 13.8
2 Month
3 Month
9.54 × Ø 13.9
3 Month
6 Month
12.3 × Ø 21.3
6 Month
9 Month
11.2 × Ø 20.7
9 Month
1 Year
10.9 ×
USD DEM
Ø 19.6
1 Year
Arrow marks the direction of link/causality. ×=means significance at 1% level, and   means significance at 5% level.
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4.4.3 Links between interest and exchange rates
We also researched links between the exchange rate and interest rate.
Table 4.11 presents a comprehensive picture of the situation on the market
in 1997. For both currencies (US dollar and Deutsche mark) there exists a
strong link between short and long-term interest rates that have an
influence on exchange rate. However, the opposite link—the exchange
rate influencing the interest rate—was detected only for short-term interest
rates.
4.5 Comments and implications
The goal of this paper was to assess the interactions between short and
long interest rates and between exchange and interest rates. In particular,
we have studied linkages between interest rates, as well as exchange rates
and interest rates, and compared the results of pre-crisis periods with those
in a year of turbulence. While strong bilateral links support the hypothesis
of market integration, a unilateral link leads to market segmentation and
arbitrage opportunities.
The relatively stable environment of the fixed exchange rate regime and
semi-regulated interest rates provided a soft environment for the evolution
of links among key interest rates. The bonds among interest rates tended
to evolve in a weak economic sense. They naturally changed from 1993,
when a modern banking sector emerged in the country. In 1996 these links
were found to be quite independent. The peaceful evolution lasted till the
beginning of 1997, when turbulence started to sweep the entire industry
and to erode the original arrangements. Even the financial crisis was
damaging economy, at least it helped to reestablish links on the money
market.
It was not our purpose to discuss whether the interest rates were
correctly or incorrectly set during the crisis. Rather we took the interest
rate settings as exogenous shocks and analyzed what their impact has
been. During the turbulent times of a financial crisis, the prevailing links
among interest rates tended to gain strength. The mutual links among
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interest rates are visibly abundant among almost all interest rates. Two-
way links show that one-week and two-week interest rates lost their
exclusive position on the market. The evolution of linkages show that
interest rates influenced the exchange rate during the year of crisis. The
exchange rate was found to influence only the short-term interest rates.
As a policy implication we feel that despite the fact that the financial
crisis started due to the unreal exchange rate, the rise in interest rates was
the most damaging factor. The CNB kept the exchange rate pegged to the
currency basket far too long and the koruna eventually moved too far from
its market equilibrium level. The CNB should abandon such an exchange
rate regime much earlier, at the mid of 1996 at latest. During the financial
crisis the CNB cut the commercial banks almost entirely out of liquidity
what should not happen. Its reluctance to lower the interest rates for the
sake of slower adjustment of the exchange rate caused even stronger
pressure on manufacturers and services providers. Thus, the artificial
nominal stability of exchange rate proved to be quite expensive.
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5 Convergence of exchange rates
5.1 Exchange rate and its regime in transition countries
5.1.1 Institutional environment
From the very beginning of the transition process in Central and Eastern
European economies, exchange rate behavior and associated exchange
rate regimes were closely monitored. The choice of a particular exchange
rate regime is one of the major policy decisions countries in transition had
to make. This topic was extensively discussed by Edison and Melvin
(1990), Edwards (1993), Quirk (1994), Begg (1996), and Sachs (1996),
among others.
Exchange regimes and the evolution of nominal exchange rates relative
to major currencies differ widely across the transition countries. The
Czech Republic and Slovakia favored the semi-fixed regime of a basket
peg, while Hungary moved from an adjustable peg to a pre-announced
crawling band in 1995, and Poland moved from a fixed basket peg to a
crawling basket peg. Many other countries in the region favored a
managed float or currency board. Table 5.1 summarizes the types of
exchange rate regimes that the CEE countries have adopted since their
economic transition.
A fundamental issue is how the exchange rates themselves evolved
during the transition process. Koch (1997) reviews and analyzes monetary
and exchange rate policy issues in selected European transition countries
and provides a timely and thorough survey of the monetary practices in the
Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary with cross references to other
transition countries. Graphs that illustrate both nominal and real evolution
of exchange rates are also presented later in this analysis.
A strength of a currency normally corresponds to the strength of an
entire economy. Thus an exchange rate can be considered as a monetary
52
mirror of a real side of an economy as a whole. When we take into the
account a high degree of openness of the CEE economies we have to
admit that exchange rate is an important variable within the scope of how
these economies are becoming interconnected. This is, beside other facts,
a reason why it is important to study exchange rate convergence. An
innovative way of analyzing this process is to examine whether the
differentials of exchange rate changes converge or diverge over time. We
provide a complete formal definition of exchange rate convergence in
section 5.3.
Table 5.1 Exchange Rate Regimes
Country Regime
Czech Republic Fixed (basket peg) since January 1991 to May 1997
Float from May 1997
Slovakia Fixed (basket peg) since January 1991
Hungary Adjustable peg (basket peg) since before 1989
Pre-announced crawling band (peg) since March 1995
Poland Fixed (basket peg) from January 1990 to October 1991
Pre-announced crawling peg from October 1991 to May 1995
Float within crawling band from May 1995 to January 1996
Pre-announced crawling peg from January 1996
Slovenia Managed float from October 1991
Bulgaria Managed float from February 1991
Currency board from July 1997
Romania Managed float from August 1992
Albania Managed float from July 1992
Estonia Currency board from june 1992
Latvia Managed float from July 1992 (in reality peg to SDR basket)
Lithuania Float from October 1992 to April 1994
Currency board from April 1994
From the historical context the issue of the exchange rate convergence
starts with a launch of transition reforms. At the beginning of the
transition process most of the CEE countries devalued their national
currencies. Halpern and Wyplosz (1995) suggest four main factors for the
initially large undervaluation of transition currencies: (i) the existence of
monetary overhang, (ii) pent-up demand for foreign assets, (iii) the lack of
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credibility on the part of the new authorities, and (iv) total uncertainty
about the appropriate equilibrium exchange rate and, therefore, the
tendency for risk-averse authorities to err on the side of undervaluation
rather than overvaluation. The crucial reason for undervaluation seems to
be more simple: the rates were undervalued in order to be long lasting and
able to promote exports of local companies while discouraging mainly
imports of consumer goods.
Massive devaluation was also meant to partially offset substantial
inflation that the CEE countries were expected to experience. Indeed they
did and the Transition Report (1997) of the EBRD serves as a compact
reference for this subject. Thus, evolution of nominal exchange rates in
the CEE countries might alone provide a misleading picture. Nevertheless,
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 comprehensively document the evolution of nominal
exchange rates in all the countries under consideration from 1991 to 1997.
The Czech koruna remained quite stable and depreciated in connection
with the financial crisis in summer of 1997. The nominal exchange rates
of Poland and Hungary depreciated over time. The Slovak koruna was
devalued by 10% in July 1993, but remained more or less stable during the
period. The nominal exchange rates of Slovenia and other Balkan
countries also depreciated to a greater or lesser extent over the researched
period. The Baltic countries offer interesting picture of evolution, as its
countries were severing monetary ties with the former Soviet Union while
gradually establishing different exchange rate regimes.
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5.1.2 Real exchange rate
It is inflation that in case of transition economies is likely to substantially
differentiate nominal and real sides of the story. In order to see the real
evolution of the national currencies we explore the real exchange rates.
For the purpose of econometric analysis the real exchange rates (Qt) of
national currencies in relation to the US Dollar and the Deutsche Mark
were constructed in the usual manner as
( ) tttt CPICPIEQ /*×= (5.1)
where tQ  is the defined real exchange rate, tE  is a nominal exchange rate,
tCPI  is a domestic consumer price index (CPI), and 
*
tCPI  is a foreign
CPI.
Figure 5.3 and 5.4 illustrate the evolution of currencies in real terms.
The real exchange rates are plotted in levels. The currencies of the
countries belonging to the Visegrad Four continuously appreciated in real
terms over time, but the extent of appreciation varied. Koch (1997) claims
that the empirical evidence indicates that the current level of the real
effective exchange rates does not appear to be seriously out of line with
the underlying fundamentals of the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary.
The Baltic countries uniformly experienced a massive real appreciation
during 1992. This movement, over next two years, transformed into an
almost stable real exchange rate. The Balkan countries together with
Slovenia offer the most varied picture of currencies which appreciated and
depreciated in real terms over time.
Koch (1997) argues that in general terms, in most of the CEE countries
occurred a period when real appreciation has been stronger when
measured in consumer rather than producer prices. The two most
important factors that may explain such difference are phasing-out of
consumer subsidies (affecting CPI) and an increased demand for services
(affecting both CPI and PPI) combined with an initially small services
sector. In any event it is a real exchange rate that in fact matters to deliver
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an information about a real strength of a national currency. This is the
reason why it is only the real exchange rate that matters for analysis of
exchange rate convergence.
Real exchange convergence is especially important with respect to
eventual accession of the CEE countries to the EU. As for the EU itself
convergence has taken place within the framework of the European
Monetary System (EMS) and has accelerated with the announcement of
the Euro. Such process is expected to continue with the following
schedule in mind. On January 1, 1999 the European Commission will
settle irrevocable exchange rates between individual national currencies of
the member states of the EMU and Euro. The European Central Bank
(ECB), that will start to function, will be handed mandate to conduct
common policy on behalf of central banks of individual member
countries. Member states will convert their debts into Euro. Transition
period will start to introduce new measures associated with a single
currency and will last to 2002. During 2000 the ECB will supervise and
monitor exchange of banknotes according to fixed exchange rates.
National currencies and Euro banknotes will be allowed to circulate
together during 2001. The transition period ends in 2002 and by January 1,
member countries will convert their public expenditures into Euro. From
July 1 on, the Euro (and its fraction cent) will become a sole and legal
mean of payment within the member states of the EMU.
As it was hinted earlier an exchange rate convergence cannot be
discussed as a phenomenon isolated from other variables, specifically
inflation that disguise the real picture. The EU countries participating in
the European Monetary System (EMS) have already a record of their
exchange rates convergence. Sarno (1997) found evidence of long-run
convergence for both nominal and real exchange rates that was more
frequent in cases of countries that adhered to the Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM) than for the non-ERM countries. This suggests that the
ERM of the EMS has been effective in reducing the tendency towards
exchange rate misalignment, at least among its own members. Kocenda
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and Papell (1997) found evidence of dramatic convergence in inflation
rates among the countries that adhered to the ERM. The results therefore
suggest that a significant increase in policy convergence has been
achieved within the EMS.
5.1.3 Convergence and exchange rate regime
Starting massive devaluation at the beginning of transition reforms was
tied with new exchange regimes in respective countries. The choice of an
exchange rate regime was an institutional decision of each country that
often depended to various extent on the advice of an international
institution (the IMF for example). Any form of non-free-float exchange
regime (i.e. fixed, pegged, crawling-peg, managed float etc.) requires a
certain degree of commitment from the monetary authorities. Such a
commitment is a way of creating a consistent policy and establishing
confidence in the policy actions of monetary authorities. For example the
peg to a single currency may be the exchange regime with the greatest
potential to gain credibility because it represent the simplest rule that is
clear and understood by both the policy makers and the public.
Although the problem of exchange regime choice is of major concern
for transition countries, the optimality of any such choice is subject to
debate. The reason stems from two stylized facts: (i) no exchange regime
has proven to be everlasting, and (ii) countries have tended to shift back
and forth between exchange rate regimes. Despite the fact that the
suitability of any adopted exchange rate regime remains an important
topic in transition economies, its choice resulted from economic and/or
political forces dominating each country at a time.
Currently ten countries in Central and Eastern Europe have formally
applied for full membership in the European Union. In the future a crucial
issue will be to harmonize exchange rate policies of the CEE countries
with those prevailing in the European Union and especially with the
forthcoming European Monetary Union (EMU). In case of the CEE
countries a relevant and related question arises. With so many varieties of
69
exchange rate regimes does the degree of convergence depend on a
particular exchange rate regime? Or in other words, is convergence faster
in countries that favored some kind of tight exchange regime opposite to a
rather free one?
According to the recommendations of the IMF many transition
economies adopted exchange rate regimes characterized by different
degrees of flexibility and management. Several countries, including the
Czech Republic, adopted an exchange regime based on a currency basket
peg. Such a regime is, according to the IMF, characterized as a fixed
exchange rate regime. However, a critical difference is that such an
exchange rate is actually pegged to a currency basket rather than fixed to
one foreign currency. The essence of the argument comes from a possible
dichotomy between exchange rate regime and monetary policy. For further
details see Kocenda (1998).
In the case of the fixed regime, a country has by definition an exchange
regime policy, gives up its own monetary policy, and the origin of a
monetary base is purely a foreign one. The exact opposite is true for a
floating exchange regime. A crucial difference arises in the case of a
pegged regime whereby a country maintains both exchange rate and
monetary policies. Under such an arrangement, eventual conflict between
these two policies is likely to materialize due to the both domestic and
foreign origin of the monetary base. Such a conflict may eventually evolve
into a balance of payments crisis. The kind of exchange regime is thus
likely to affect degree of exchange convergence as well.
The transition process in Central and Eastern Europe provides a unique
opportunity to carry out quantitative analysis of exchange rate
convergence within distinctive groups of the CEE countries based on
different exchange rate regimes. This project addresses the question as to
whether the transition countries have achieved exchange rate convergence
and what are the implications for their eventual accession to the European
Union.
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5.2 Data and definitions
We use the data from the following eleven countries: the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania,
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The time span of the data is from January
1991 to December 1997. The monthly averages of exchange rates of
respective national currencies were obtained from the Bank for
International Settlements, Basel, the International Monetary Fund’s
International Financial Statistics, and the EBRD. The monthly consumer
price indices were obtained from the latter two sources. The bulletins of
the national banks of each country in question were consulted as well.
The prevalent view in the literature is that floating exchange rates follow
a random walk. No strong statistical evidence has emerged to confirm or
refute this view so far (see Brock, Hsieh, and LeBaron (1993), p.130).
Such behavior was not found in case of exchange rates of transition
economies. This is apparently due to the nature of their exchange rate
regimes and the fact that these economies are still undergoing huge
structural shifts. The data (exchange rates) are not stationary but are
integrated of degree one. The analysis is therefore performed on the
changes in exchange rates between two consecutive periods. These
changes are analogous to the first logarithmic differences. Such a method
of how to achieve stationarity is preferred to that of detrending the data.
By their nature the exchange rates contain polynomial trends of different
degrees and thus a formerly described method is preferred to the latter
one.
For the purpose of further analysis the countries were pooled in several
logically differentiated groups. There are 84 observations per country and
the dimension of each panel data structure changes accordingly. Table 5.2
shows all the countries that were included in our analysis and describes
the composition of the various groups for which we tested the
convergence hypothesis.
The institutional groups are defined with respect to eventual accession.
Three groups were formed with respect to the analyses of progress in
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economic and political transition made by the EBRD about ten countries
that have applied for the membership in the European Union. According
to the European Commission five of the countries were identified as
leading candidates in terms of the progress they have made so far. These
are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and Estonia and form
the First Round group. Removing Estonia makes a control group because
this country maintained currency board exchange regime throughout the
researched period. Thus, elimination of Estonia from The First Round
group should be understood as a purely institutional step. The Second
Round group was formed from Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and
Slovakia.
Table 5.2 Groups of Countries in Each Panel Data Set
Group No. Countries
Accession Rounds Groups
First Round 5 Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Estonia
First Round w/o
Estonia
4 Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia
Second Round 5 Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia
Exchange Rate Regime Groups
Peg (A) 4 Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Latvia
Peg (B) 5 Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Latvia, Czech Republic
Fix 2 Estonia, Lithuania
Float (A) 4 Albania, Romania, Slovenia, Bulgaria
Float (B) 5 Albania, Romania, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Czech republic
No. denotes number of countries in a particular group.
Other groups were formed on the basis of the exchange rate regime
prevailing in each country for the time span of our analysis. There are two
groups with a peg regime. One group, Peg A, contains Slovakia, Hungary,
Poland, and Latvia. The other group, Peg B, includes also the Czech
Republic. This country abandoned currency basket peg regime in May
1997 and therefore two peg groups were created. There is one group of
countries that maintains fixed regime. The group is called Fix and
contains Estonia and Lithuania. At last, we formed two groups of
countries with float regimes. The Float A group contains Albania,
72
Romania, Slovenia, and Bulgaria. The control Float B group in addition
includes also the Czech Republic. Bulgaria is included in both groups
because this country changed its regime from the managed float to a
currency board only recently in July 1997. Pooling countries in certain
groups is meant to show not only the consistency, but also the sensitivity
of our results.
A detailed description of the method to test for convergence follows in
the next section. That section concentrates on investigating logically
structured groups of countries to see how the differences in exchange rate
differentials evolved over time, i.e. whether they increased or diminished.
5.3 Methodology of convergence
5.3.1 Definitions
The usual notion of convergence is that the difference between two or
more variables should become negligible over time. The formal way of
describing this event is to employ a useful concept from large-sample
distribution theory (for details and proofs regarding following subject see
Greene (1993), pp. 99-102). We can say that the random variable nx
converges in probability to a constant c if ( ) 0Prob lim =>-
¥®
ecxnn  for any
positive e. Simply put, convergence in probability implies that the values
that the variable may take that are not close to c become increasingly
unlikely. Thus, if nx  converges in probability to c we can write
cxp n =lim .
A special case of convergence in probability is convergence in mean
square or convergence in quadratic mean that can be characterize the
following way. If nx  has mean nm  and variance 
2
ns  such that the ordinary
limits of nm  and 
2
ns  are c and 0 respectively, then nx  converges in mean
square to c, and cxp n =lim . It can be shown that convergence in
probability does not imply convergence in mean square, however,
convergence in mean square implies convergence in probability. The
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conditions for convergence in mean square are usually easier to verify
than those for more general form. We will use the outlined ideas in testing
for convergence in macroeconomic fundamentals using the method of the
panel unit-root test.
The following econometric methodology, which was exploited in
several published empirical analyses, utilizes a combination of cross-
sections of individual time-series. Ben-David (1995, 1996) performed an
analysis of real per-capita income growth on numerous countries.
Kocenda and Papell (1997) recently applied this methodology to study
inflation convergence in the European Union. Papell (1997) tested
purchasing power parity for the real exchange rates of 20 developed
countries. Kocenda and Hanousek (1998) tested for convergence and
integration of Asian capital markets.
A panel data analysis of the convergence of exchange rate differentials
is conducted in order to fully exploit the effect of cross-variances in a
pooled time series of moderate length. Previous econometric research has
demonstrated the specific advantages of utilizing panel data in studying a
wide range of economic issues. As shown by Levin and Lin (1992), the
statistical power of a unit root test for a relatively small panel may be an
order of magnitude higher than the power of the test for a single time
series.
The analysis is performed for two types of exchange rates (Xt) which are
measured as a change in the respective exchange rate over two successive
periods. The individual nominal change in the exchange rate between two
consecutive months is defined as
( ) 11ttt -= -EEEX (5.2)
where tE  denotes the nominal exchange rate at time t. In a consistent
manner we define the change in the real exchange rate as
( ) 11t -= -tt QQQX (5.3)
where tQ  is a real exchange rate at a time t as defined earlier in equation
(5.1).
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We model the evolution of exchange rates )( tX  for a group of i
individual countries with observations spanning over t time periods in the
following way:
tititi XX ,1,, efa ++= - (5.4)
The fact that the exchange rate is modeled as an autoregressive process is
based on the common practice in the literature and does not represent any
theory of how this variable is determined. It also constitutes a suitable
form for the convergence test introduced later in this section.
The convergence measure adopted here is based on a relationship that
describes the dynamics of exchange rate differentials in a panel setting.
Formally, we can transcribe this as follows:
( ) tittitti uXXXX ,11,, +-=- --f (5.5)
where å
=
=
n
i
tit Xn
X
1
,
1
. In the presence of pooling, the intercept a vanishes
since, by construction, the exchange rate differentials have a zero mean
over all the countries and time periods. How the countries are pooled into
different groups was described in detail in the previous section.
Convergence in this context requires that the differentials of the
respective variables become smaller and smaller over time. For this to be
true f must be less than one. On other hand, f greater than one indicates a
divergence of these differentials. The value of f itself then tells us about
the degree of convergence. Further, one of the sufficient conditions for
convergence in our context is that the sample average of squared
differentials must decrease over time, as we outlined in the beginning of
this section.
5.3.2 Panel unit-root test
The convergence coefficient f for a particular group of countries can be
obtained using the Dickey and Fuller (1979) test on equation (5.5). The
augmented version of this test (ADF) is used in order to remove possible
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serial correlation from the data. It was found that, in cases of both nominal
and real exchange rates, the correlation sensitivity threshold was about
0.50. Employing the ridge regression of Hoerl and Kennard (1970)
compensated for the encountered multicollinearity.
Since the analysis is performed on panel data of exchange rate changes,
there will be no intercept by construction. Denoting the exchange rate
differential as ttiti XXd -= ,, , and its difference as 1,,, --=D tititi ddd , the
equation for the ADF test is written as
( ) ti
k
j
jtijtiti zddd ,
1
,1,, 1 +D--=D å
=
-- gf (5.6)
where the subscript i = 1,...,k indexes the countries in a particular group.
Equation (5.6) tests for a unit root in the panel of exchange rate
differentials. The null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected in favor of the
alternative of level stationarity if ( )1-f  is significantly different from
zero or, implicitly, if f is significantly different from one.
The number of lagged differences k is determined using the parametric
method proposed by Campbell and Perron (1991) and Ng and Perron
(1995). An upper bound of the number of lagged differences kmax is
initially set at an appropriate level. 7max =k  since monthly data are used.
We also wanted to incorporate up to half-year lags between monetary and
real sides of economy.
The regression is estimated and the significance of the coefficient gj is
determined. If the coefficient is not found to be significant, then k is
reduced by one and the equation (6) is re-estimated. This procedure is
repeated with a diminishing number of lagged differences until the
coefficient is found to be significant. If no coefficient is found to be
significant in conjunction with the respective k, then k = 0 and a standard
form of the Dickey-Fuller test is used in the analysis. A ten- percent value
of the asymptotic normal distribution (1.64) is used to assess the
significance of the last lag. The advantage of this recursive t-statistic
method over alternative procedures where k is either fixed or selected in
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order to minimize the Akaike Information Criterion is discussed in detail
by Ng and Perron (1995).
Recent work has established that a sub-unity convergence coefficient f
is indeed a robust indication of convergence which is respectively true for
divergence (when f > 1). Ben-David (1995) performed 10,000 simulations
for each of three possible cases where data should portray the processes of
convergence, divergence, and neutrality. His numerous simulations
provide ample evidence of convergence or divergence when these features
truly reflect the situation. When neutral data with no strong inclination in
either direction are used, the convergence coefficient tends towards unity.
To evaluate the statistical significance of the convergence coefficient f
we cannot use the standard critical values which are used when such an
analysis is conducted on panel data. The common critical values for panel
unit root tests tabulated by Levin and Lin (1992) do not incorporate serial
correlation in disturbances and are, therefore, incorrect for small samples
of data. Using the Monte Carlo technique, Papell (1997) tabulated critical
values taking serial correlation into account and found that, for both
quarterly and monthly data in his data sets, the critical values were higher
than those reported in Levin and Lin (1992). A similar result was found in
Kocenda and Papell (1997).
Because of these findings, the exact finite sample critical values for the
resulting test statistics were computed using the Monte Carlo method in
the following way. Autoregressive (AR) models were first fit to the first
differences of each panel group of exchange rate differentials using the
Schwarz (1978) criterion to choose the optimal AR models. These optimal
estimated AR models were then considered to be the true data generating
process for errors of each of the panel group of data. Finally, for each
panel, pseudo samples of corresponding size were constructed employing
the optimal AR models described earlier with iid ),0( 2sN  innovations.
The variance 2s  is the estimated innovation variance of a particular
optimal AR model. The resulting test statistic is the t-statistic on the
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coefficient (1-f) in equation (5.6), with lag length k for each panel group
chosen as described above.
This process was replicated 10,000 times and the critical values for the
finite sample distributions were obtained from the sorted vector of such
replicated statistics. The derived finite sample critical values are reported
for significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% in the tables, along with the
results of the ADF test conducted on different panel groups in the
respective time periods.
5.4 Empirical results of convergence analysis
5.4.1 Nominal convergence
Earlier in section 5.1.2 we argued that in the framework of transition
economies it is the real exchange rate convergence that matters. Despite
this fact we report results of nominal convergence as well in order to
provide reader with an institutional overview as well as with the data. We
justify this by two reasons.
One reason why it is legitimate to analyze the nominal convergence is
that in theory real exchange rate should behave the same way no matter
whether the nominal rate is pegged or not because the price level should
move as well. In practice, however, price level movements are much
slower than nominal exchange rate movements and the convergence
should be different as well. The second reason is that by fixing or pegging
nominal exchange rate the authorities aim to lower inflation. By definition
the fixed or pegged regimes should affect real exchange rate changes in a
different manner than the floating regime.
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Table 5.3 US Dollar Nominal Exchange Rates: Period 1991:1 - 1997:12
Group No. f t-stat(f) k        Critical Values
  1%       5%        10%
Accession Rounds Groups
First Round 5 0.5152a -5.16 5 -3.19 -2.41 -1.93
First Round w/o Estonia 4 0.5109a -4.70 5 -2.81 -2.07 -1.69
Second Round 5 0.4188a -5.35 6 -3.34 -2.28 -1.80
Exchange Rate Regime Groups
Peg (A) 4 0.5216a -6.71 5 -2.80 -2.05 -1.66
Peg (B) 5 0.5716a -6.53 6 -2.98 -2.22 -1.80
Fix 2 0.4988a -4.12 5 -3.77 -2.40 -1.93
Float (A) 4 0.2861a -5.26 6 -2.98 -2.16 -1.74
Float (B) 5 0.3296a -5.86 6 -3.40 -2.23 -1.82
No. means number of countries in a particular group, k denotes number of lags.
a denotes significance at 1% level.
Table 5.4 Deutsche Mark Nominal Exchange Rates: Period 1991:1 - 1997:12
Group No. f t-stat(f) k        Critical Values
  1%       5%        10%
Accession Rounds Groups
First Round 5 0.5107a -5.20 5 -3.20 -2.41 -1.95
First Round w/o Estonia 4 0.5061a -4.74 5 -2.94 -2.19 -1.75
Second Round 5 0.4122a -5.37 6 -3.37 -2.29 -1.80
Exchange Rate Regime Groups
Peg (A) 4 0.5234a -6.71 5 -2.79 -2.06 -1.66
Peg (B) 5 0.5413a -7.47 5 -2.88 -2.15 -1.70
Fix 2 0.4996a -4.12 5 -3.81 -2.42 -1.95
Float (A) 4 0.2717a -5.32 6 -2.84 -2.14 -1.72
Float (B) 5 0.3181a -5.92 6 -3.33 -2.24 -1.82
No. means number of countries in a particular group, k denotes number of lags.
a denotes significance at 1% level.
The results of convergence tests for all constructed groups of countries
are presented in four tables. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show results for the
nominal exchange rate differentials as an introduction to the principal part
of real exchange rates. The results of the test performed on exchange rate
differentials expressed in US Dollars and Deutsche Marks show that the
values of coefficient f are very similar, but not completely identical. The
coefficients are lower than and significantly different from one. Thus, the
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differences in the differentials of all groups clearly diminish over time.
From the construction of the test it follows that, as the value of the
statistically significant coefficient f approaches unity in absolute value,
the convergence effect decreases and vanishes. Implicitly, as the value of
the statistically significant coefficient f approaches zero, the convergence
effect becomes greater. Although it is coefficient f that we are interested
in because its value provides us with an information about the degree of
convergence, it was mentioned in the previous section that (f<1) per se
does not necessarily imply convergence. The sufficient condition must be
satisfied and therefore, the sample average of squared return differentials
(i.e. sample dispersion) was computed as well. We did not reject
hypothesis that sample dispersion was decreasing over time for all groups
of countries listed in Table 5.2.
When we compare the two groups seeking accession, we can see that
both of them show comparable speed of convergence. However, the
Second Round group fares somehow better. Performance of the groups
divided on the base of the exchange rate regime is shown in the second
part of both tables. Countries with a float regime converge at the fastest
pace, followed by those with a fixed regime. The countries favoring peg
regime stand at the last place.
The primary results of the convergence test on differentials of real
exchange rates are presented in Tables 5.5 and 5.6. The countries of the
First Round converge at slower pace than those from the Second Round.
However, when Estonia is removed from the First Round group, than this
group surpasses the Second Round group. These results may be caused by
two reasons. First one is an extent of economic integration of the CEE
countries with the EU. Such an extent should be greater for the countries
of the First Group. This effect mirroring the real side of the economy
should be even more pronounced in the later years of transition. The
second reason stems from the monetary side and reflects the beginning
situation when exchange rate and inflation in particular countries started
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to evolve from very different conditions. Unfortunately, both two effects
tend to cancel each other with respect to the speed of convergence.
In order to investigate the extent of both effects, the test was performed
on First and Second Round groups again but this time the time span was
divided to two periods of equal length of three and half years (1991:1 –
1993:6 and 1993:7 – 1997:12).
Table 5.5 US Dollar Real Exchange Rates: Period 1991:1 - 1997:12
Group No. f t-stat(f) k        Critical Values
  1%       5%        10%
Accession Rounds Groups
First Round 5 0.5575a -8.04 6 -2.74 -2.07 -1.70
First Round w/o Estonia 4 0.1959a -10.80 4 -2.76 -2.05 -1.68
Second Round 5 0.2163a -4.98 7 -2.95 -2.20 -1.77
Exchange Rate Regime Groups
Peg (A) 4 0.6958a -4.38 6 -2.91 -2.15 -1.71
Peg (B) 5 0.6806a -5.13 6 -2.88 -2.10 -1.74
Fix 2 0.4440b -4.11 4 -4.46 -2.39 -1.90
Float (A) 4 0.1028a -4.82 7 -2.87 -2.07 -1.65
Float (B) 5 0.1758a -7.22 6 -2.79 -2.05 -1.69
No. means number of countries in a particular group, k denotes number of lags.
a and b denote significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
Table 5.6 Deutsche Mark Real Exchange Rates: Period 1991:1 - 1997:12
Group No. f t-stat(f) k        Critical Values
  1%       5%        10%
Accession Rounds Groups
First Round 5 0.5552a -8.14 6 -2.86 -2.06 -1.64
First Round w/o Estonia 4 0.2008a -10.88 4 -2.79 -2.05 -1.69
Second Round 5 0.2061a -5.01 7 -2.90 -2.15 -1.70
Exchange Rate Regime Groups
Peg (A) 4 0.6398a -5.13 5 -2.87 -2.11 -1.73
Peg (B) 5 0.6239a -5.96 5 -2.83 -2.11 -1.72
Fix 2 0.4395b -4.10 4 -4.47 -2.43 -1.91
Float (A) 4 0.0978a -4.86 7 -2.90 -2.15 -1.70
Float (B) 5 0.1807a -7.28 6 -2.85 -2.09 -1.74
No. means number of countries in a particular group, k denotes number of lags.
a and b denote significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
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We opted for such division because of the necessary requirements for
panel data format. The panel has to have a certain dimension given by the
number of countries and time periods to yield reliable results.
Investigation that would account for time periods which are determined by
regime switches in individual countries would lead to identification
problems and/or unreliable parameter estimates. Such panels would then
simply yield incorrect results.
Table 5.7 US Dollar Real Exchange Rates: Two Period Division
Group No. f t-stat(f) k        Critical Values
  1%       5%        10%
Period 1991:1 – 1993:6
First Round w/o Estonia 4 0.4145 -8.23a 4 -3.55 -2.46 -2.01
Second Round 5 0.2498 -2.98b 7 -3.22 -2.39 -1.94
Second Round w/o Lithuania 4 0.1680 -2.92b 7 -2.99 -2.21 -1.76
Period 1993:7 – 1997:12
First Round w/o Estonia 4 0.1205 -6.08a 4 -3.04 -2.28 -1.89
Second Round 5 0.1616 -4.26a 6 -3.63 -2.52 -2.00
Second Round w/o Lithuania 4 0.2001 -4.29a 7 -3.45 -2.41 -1.91
No. means number of countries in a particular group, k denotes number of lags.
a and b denote significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
Table 5.8 Deutsche Mark Real Exchange Rates: Two Period Division
Group No. f t-stat(f) k        Critical Values
  1%       5%        10%
Period 1991:1 – 1993:6
First Round w/o Estonia 4 0.4284 -8.34a 4 -3.50 -2.47 -2.01
Second Round 5 0.2346 -3.02b 7 -3.20 -2.37 -1.92
Second Round w/o Lithuania 4 0.1556 -2.95b 7 -2.99 -2.21 -1.77
Period 1993:7 – 1997:12
First Round w/o Estonia 4 0.1253 -6.07a 4 -3.12 -2.32 -1.93
Second Round 5 0.1735 -4.24a 6 -3.62 -2.52 -2.00
Second Round w/o Lithuania 4 0.1816 -4.26a 7 -3.46 -2.40 -1.90
No. means number of countries in a particular group, k denotes number of lags.
a and b denote significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
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The results for periods 1991:1 – 1993:6 and 1993:7 – 1997:12 are
reported in Tables 5.7 and 5.8. For both currencies we can see that the
Second Round group converges during the earlier period of transition at
the faster pace than the First Round group. The monetary effect
representing the beginning conditions thus prevails since the degree of real
integration was quite limited in that time. However, during the later period
of transition the First Round group converges faster then the Second
Round group. This is presumably due to the higher degree of real
economic integration of the CEE countries with the EU that was achieved
at the advanced stage of the transition period. Thus we can conclude that
the countries of the First Round are, from the point of their exchange rate
conversion, better equipped for accession to the EU.
Additional information about real convergence is contained in the
second part of Table 5.5 and 5.6. When we compare countries according
to their exchange rate regimes, then countries with the float regime show
greater degree of convergence than those with fixed regimes. The groups
of countries with peg regimes converge at the slowest pace.
We conclude that the peg regime is the least effective regime to promote
convergence in both nominal and real terms. On other hand, the float
regime seems to be one that is most effective in this sense. Fixed regime
lies between. The policy implication of these facts is that the countries
with a float or fixed exchange rate regimes are cutting disparities among
the exchange rates of their currencies faster than those with a peg regime.
It comes as a no surprise that the First Round countries also favor the
regimes that allow for faster convergence.
Quite interesting conclusion stems from comparison of results that come
from two different currencies in which exchange rates are expressed. The
exchange rates in Deutsche Mark show higher degree of convergence than
those expressed in US Dollars. The difference is not large but consistent
across all the groups. This fact hints on the stabilizing effect of Deutsche
Mark for the exchange rates of the CEE countries.
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Convergence of nominal exchange rates is an indicator of increasing
stability of the currencies. It is not an incidental event that majority of the
CEE countries included Deutsche Mark in their exchange rate regimes in
a form of direct peg or heavily weighted currency in a currency basket.
This can be viewed from the perspective of eventual accession to EU and
further joining the EMU. The policy implication is that convergence of
exchange rates to some long-run equilibrium is likely to be faster in case
of real exchange rates rather than nominal ones. The reason is a higher
rate of inflation in the CEE countries than that in Germany or the USA.
This is connected with the process of decreasing disparities of the
inflation rates among the CEE countries and Germany. Only after the
inflation rates in transition economies come near to that of Germany, there
will be more pronounced convergence of the nominal exchange rates.
There is certain portion of institutional noise that has to be taken into
account when presenting results of our analysis. Changes in exchange
regimes are the most important ones. In addition, at the beginning of
transition reforms exchange rates in some transition economies were
official rates for currencies that were not fully convertible yet and thus
were not really free market exchange rates. The potential impact of non-
convertibility on exchange rate convergence in this analysis is not likely to
be large. The CEE countries early during the transition reforms realized
that convertibility of currency benefits its real strength. Non-negligible
effects certainly also played wild Ponzi games in Albania and Bulgaria.
Such pyramid schemes considerably disturbed the financial sector and,
naturally, the exchange rates as well. To analyze the hypotheses outlined
above is a task for further research.
5.5 Concluding observations
The results of this paper show that there exists an exchange rate
convergence among the CEE countries in general. The degree of
convergence varies substantially among the groups of countries though.
The primary division of countries is done based on criteria of prospective
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accession to the EU and exchange rate regime prevailing in specific
countries during transition.
When we compare two groups of countries seeking accession, we can
see that both of them show comparable speed of convergence. When time
span of the data is divided to two equal periods then the Second Round
group converges during the earlier period of transition at the faster pace
than the First Round group. The monetary effect representing the
beginning conditions thus prevails since the degree of real integration was
quite limited in that time. However, during the later period of transition
the First Round group converges faster then the Second Round group. This
is presumably due to the higher degree of real economic integration of the
CEE countries with the EU that was achieved at the advanced stage of the
transition period. We can conclude that the countries of the First Round
are, from the point of their exchange rate conversion, better prepared for
accession to the EU.
Performance of the groups divided on the base of the exchange rate
regime significantly differs. Countries with a float regime converge at the
fastest pace, followed by those with a fixed regime. The countries favoring
peg regime are the slowest ones. The policy implication of these facts is
that the countries with a float or fixed exchange rate regimes are cutting
disparities among the exchange rates of their currencies faster than those
with a peg regime. The First Round countries belong among those that
favor the regimes showing faster convergence.
Further, the exchange rates in Deutsche Mark show higher degree of
convergence than those expressed in US Dollars. This fact hints on the
stabilizing effect of Deutsche Mark for the exchange rates of the CEE
countries.
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